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ABSTRACT 
Goodwill Impairment Charges under SFAS 142: 
Role of Executives’ Incentives and Corporate Governance. (May 2007) 
Lale Guler, B.A., Bogazici University;  
M.A., University of Texas at Arlington 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Anwer S. Ahmed 
 
This study examines factors that influence managers’ choice to recognize 
goodwill impairment under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 
(SFAS 142). The debate surrounding SFAS 142’s effectiveness centered on whether the 
managerial discretion allowed by the standard could lead to biased decisions in 
managers’ determination of goodwill impairment. 
I use a conditional logistic regression to compare 130 firms that did recognize the 
existing impairment losses (write-off firms) to a control sample of 130 matching firms 
that did not recognize the existing impairment losses (no write-off firms). I find that the 
likelihood of recognizing the existing impairment losses significantly decreases when 
the managers have sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. On the other hand, 
the likelihood of recognizing the existing impairment losses significantly increases when 
firms have stronger corporate governance, as measured by percentage of outside 
directors, percentage of outside directors’ ownership, number of busy directors, and 
separation of CEO and Chair titles.  
  
iv 
Additionally, I find that during the period leading up to the SFAS 142 write-off, 
there have been more favorable changes in corporate governance structures of the write-
off firms, compared to that of no write-off firms. These favorable changes in governance 
structures occurred to a greater extent in firms that have delayed the recognition of 
existing impairment losses to the sample period compared to the firms that have been 
recognizing the write-offs on a timely basis. These results are consistent with the notion 
that favorable changes in corporate governance induce firms to take SFAS 142 
impairment losses, which managers have avoided taking in the prior period.  
Overall, the results imply that managerial incentives do affect the implementation 
of standards that expand managerial discretion and highlight the importance of corporate 
boards in the monitoring of discretion allowed by such standards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS 142, 
‘Accounting for Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets’ in 2001. The standard, effective 
for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001, requires companies to review 
goodwill for impairment each year at the lowest level of business units for which 
discrete financial information is available (“reporting units”). Testing goodwill for 
impairment is a complex process that involves making a number of accounting choices 
and estimates, of which determination of the reporting units and assessment of the fair 
values at the level of reporting units are the most important. Given that fair values of 
reporting units are not readily available, managers have a significant amount of 
discretion in impairment testing. While the FASB concludes that SFAS 142 will improve 
financial reporting of goodwill and other intangible assets, critics argue that the 
managerial discretion inherent in the process of testing for impairment may lead 
managers to manipulate financial reports.1  
I examine the roles of managers’ in-the-money stock option holdings and board 
of directors’ characteristics in managers’ decisions to record goodwill impairment 
charges in order to provide information relevant to this debate.2 I focus on managers’ in-
the-money stock option holdings and board of directors’ characteristics because 
managers’ review of goodwill impairments as a form of accounting choice is likely to be 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Accounting Research. 
1
 For example, Watts (2003, p. 217) argues that because SFAS 142 requires managers to make 
unverifiable estimates, the incidence of fraudulent reporting might increase. 
2
 SFAS 142 does not affect the tax treatment of goodwill. For tax purposes, goodwill is amortized over a 
15 year period. 
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affected by their incentives to act opportunistically, as implied by agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), and constrained by the oversight 
role of boards. 
  Agency theory implies that executives who have more in-the-money stock options 
are less inclined to recognize goodwill impairment charges. When option holdings of 
executives are in the money, any decline in stock price would directly result in a 
reduction in executives’ wealth. If managers have concerns regarding the negative 
valuation consequences of goodwill impairment losses on firms’ stock prices, and 
thereby on the value of their in-the-money stock option holdings, managers could use the 
accounting discretion granted by SFAS 142 to understate the existing impairments of 
goodwill.3 Consistent with this notion, prior literature documents that managers with 
substantial in-the-money option holdings are more likely to issue misstated accounting 
information (e.g., Efendi et al., 2006). Although there is empirical evidence on the 
relation between option holdings and accounting misstatements, the empirical evidence 
on the relation between option holdings and specific accounting choices is scant. I aim to 
fill this gap by examining the relation between managers’ option holdings and the 
likelihood of recognizing goodwill impairment losses. 
While managers’ review of goodwill impairments as a form of accounting choice 
is likely to be affected by their incentives to act opportunistically, this behavior should 
                                                 
3
 Bens and Heltzer (2006) provide evidence of a negative market reaction to the announcements of 
goodwill write-offs subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 142. More specifically, the authors find that 
abnormal returns for their post-SFAS 142 sample (measured as the buy-and-hold returns over the period 
beginning the day of the goodwill write-off announcement and ending on the first trading day after the 
announcement) have an mean of -4%. 
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be constrained by the oversight role of boards. Boards of directors are responsible for 
oversight of the financial reporting process, and therefore, board oversight may constrain 
some of the managerial discretion afforded by SFAS 142. Prior studies (e.g., Dechow et 
al., 1996; Beasley 1996) show that weak corporate governance is associated with 
financial statement fraud. However, only a few studies examine whether board 
characteristics favorably affect the monitoring of accounting choice (e.g., Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2006). Given the importance of the relation between managers’ use of 
accounting choice and the quality of the financial reporting, it is important to identify 
governance mechanisms that favorably affect the monitoring of accounting choice. 
Because the reported goodwill impairment loss is highly sensitive to changes in 
underlying managerial assumptions and estimates, the impairment-testing only approach 
under SFAS 142 provides a powerful setting for testing this important question. 
I perform two tests for examining the roles of managers’ option holdings and 
board of directors’ characteristics in managers’ choice to recognize goodwill impairment 
losses. In the first test, I use a conditional logistic regression to compare 130 firms that 
did recognize the existing impairment losses (write-off firms) to a control sample of 130 
matching firms that did not recognize the existing impairment losses (no write-off 
firms). I find that impairment losses are negatively associated with executives’ in-the-
money option holdings and bonus grants, controlling for other determinants of 
impairment losses. I also find a strong positive association between firms’ decision to 
recognize existing SFAS 142 impairments and the strength of their corporate 
governance, as measured by percentage of outside directors, percentage of outside 
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directors’ ownership, number of busy directors, and separation of CEO and Chair titles. 
As an additional test, I use a censored regression to separately analyze the percentage of 
goodwill written off. The results of the censored regression yield similar results those 
reported in the logistic analysis. The inferences hold after controlling for firm-specific 
variables, industry variables and other determinants of asset write-offs and are robust to 
a number of alternative specifications. 
In the second test, I examine what changes occur in various aspects of firm 
economics, executive compensation, and governance structures in the period leading up 
to the SFAS 142 write-off. I find that during the period leading up to the SFAS 142 
write-off, there have been more favorable changes in corporate governance structures of 
the write-off firms, compared to that of no write-off firms. On average, write-off firms, 
compared to no write-off firms, were more active in reducing the percentage of inside 
directors, the number of busy directors, and the number of directors who are active 
CEOs. Similarly, in the same period, more write-off firms compared to no write-off 
firms separated their Chairman and CEO positions. Furthermore, these favorable 
changes in governance structures occurred to a greater extent in firms that have delayed 
the recognition of existing impairment losses to the sample period compared to the firms 
that have been recognizing the write-offs on a timely basis.4 In the logistic regression of 
                                                 
4
 As explained in Section 6 in further detail, I identify four categories of my sample firms based on their 
SFAS 142 choices across multiple periods: (1) timely write-off, (2) delayed write-off, (3) postponing (no 
write-off), and (4) acceleration (no write-off). Timely write-off firms are the firms that take a write-off 
when expected and do not take a write-off when not expected. Delayed write-off firms are the firms that 
do not take a write-off when they were expected (in the prior period) and delay the write-off until the 
sample period. A firm is likely to take a SFAS 142 write-off if the difference between its market value and 
book value is less than its recorded goodwill. 
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the change in SFAS 142 reporting behavior on the annual change in the variables which 
capture the economic incentives, reporting incentives and corporate governance, the 
annual change in governance variables of main interest are generally significant in 
predicted direction. These results are consistent with the notion that favorable changes in 
corporate governance induce firms to take SFAS 142 impairment losses which managers 
avoided taking in the prior period. 
In related research, Beatty and Weber (2006) examine the determinants of the 
SFAS 142 transition period write-offs by focusing on the trade-off between recording 
current impairment charges below-the-line and uncertain future impairment charges 
above-the-line.5 The authors document that if the managers have bonus plans that rely on 
earnings then SFAS 142 transition charges are less likely to be recorded and tend to be 
lower in magnitude. Additionally, they find that if a firm’s stock is traded on an 
exchange that uses financial statement measures to determine trading eligibility, then 
such firms are less likely to record the SFAS 142 transition charges. Beatty and Weber 
(2006) also find that the longer the CEO’s tenure, the less likely that a transitional 
impairment charge is recorded. On the other hand, they find that when firms’ income 
from continuing operations has a higher stock market multiple, managers are more likely 
to record the SFAS 142 transition charges.  
This study differs from Beatty and Weber (2006) in at least two ways. First, in 
contrast to Beatty and Weber (2006), I examine the roles of both managers’ in-the-
                                                 
5
 The SFAS 142 transition period impairment charges were recorded ‘below-the-line’ items as losses from 
a change in accounting principles while impairment losses subsequent to the SFAS 142 transition period 
are recorded ‘above-the-line’ in operating income. 
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money stock option holdings and firms’ board of directors’ characteristics on managers’ 
choice to recognize goodwill impairment losses. It is important to examine managers’ in-
the-money stock option holdings and firms’ board of directors’ characteristics because 
the theory (as explained above) suggests that they represent additional forces which 
affect managers’ choice to recognize goodwill impairment losses. 
Second, unlike Beatty and Weber (2006), the focus of this study is managers’ 
reporting choices with respect to impairment losses following the adoption of SFAS 142 
as opposed to the SFAS 142 transition period impairment losses. As noted earlier, the 
SFAS 142 transition period impairment charges were regarded as losses from a change 
in accounting principles and provided a one-time ‘below-the-line’ treatment while 
impairment losses subsequent to the SFAS 142 transition period are recorded ‘above-
the-line’ in operating income. It is important to examine goodwill impairment losses 
subsequent to initial application of SFAS 142 because impairment losses subsequent to 
the transitional period are less likely to be affected by the managerial incentives specific 
to the transitional period. In the period subsequent to the transition to SFAS 142, the 
intensity and nature of managerial incentives and other determinants of impairment 
losses can change. Additionally, prior research shows that investors place a higher 
valuation weight on recurring earnings than on special items (e.g., Elliott and Hanna, 
1996). This implies that the study of goodwill impairment losses subsequent to the 
transition period is both important and timely. As a result, in my main analyses, I focus 
on goodwill impairment losses subsequent to the transition period. However, I do 
analyze the transition period write-offs as an additional test (Section 6.1). 
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Overall, the results suggest that while managers with substantial holdings of in-
the-money options are reluctant to recognize impairment losses, strong boards constrain 
this incentive. Thus, I contribute to the stream of accounting choice literature which 
examines how multiple forces affect accounting choice, and address one of the questions 
posed by Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) of how multiple and often conflicting forces 
affect accounting choice.  
Given the current trend of increasing managerial discretion allowed under the 
U.S. GAAP as the FASB continues to move towards ‘fair value accounting’ and 
‘principles-based standards’, these results are potentially of interest to standard setters 
for at least two reasons. First, the results suggest that managerial incentives do affect the 
implementation of standards that allow for expanded managerial discretion. Second, the 
results highlight the importance of corporate boards in monitoring of discretion allowed 
by such standards.  
This study proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present background on SFAS 142 
and main findings of the prior research. Section 3 provides a description of my 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the research methodology. Section 5 
describes my empirical results. Section 6 presents the results of additional analyses and I 
conclude in Section 7. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Accounting for Goodwill 
Prior to the enactment of SFAS 142, accounting for goodwill was based on APB 
Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets. Issued in 1970, APB Opinion No. 17 required any 
goodwill recorded following an acquisition to be amortized over a period not to exceed 
40 years. Empirical evidence shows that many companies adopted the 40-year maximum 
as the useful life in calculating amortization expense to minimize the periodic earnings 
effect (Duvall et al. 1992). Investors did not regard goodwill amortization expense as 
value-relevant (e.g., Jennings et al., 1996). Additionally, many companies attempted to 
neutralize the income effect of goodwill amortization by providing supplementary ‘pro 
forma’ reports (Huefner and Largay, 2004). The assumption underlying these practices 
was that goodwill does not necessarily decrease on a regular and systematic basis, which 
is inconsistent with the requirement of amortizing a fixed amount of goodwill every 
year.  
APB Opinion No.17 called for tests for goodwill impairment at the “enterprise 
level.” However, it did not detail when and how to measure the existence or extent of 
enterprise level goodwill impairment, and it was not precise as to when recognition of 
impairment is necessary in cases where the unamortized value of goodwill was greater 
than its economic value. If a group of assets were being tested for impairment and 
goodwill was related to the asset group, then goodwill was tested for impairment 
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according to SFAS 121.6 Relative to APB Opinion No. 17, SFAS 121 provided more 
specific guidelines for identifying and measuring impairment at asset group level. 
However, the concern about SFAS 121 was that its threshold for impairment which was 
based on undiscounted cash flows might not be sensitive enough to detect existing 
impairments of goodwill. 
The central objective of SFAS 142 is to reflect the underlying economic value of 
goodwill on their financial statements. SFAS 142 eliminates the amortization of 
goodwill and requires testing of impairment at least annually, at the reporting unit level.7 
To test goodwill for impairment, managers must first define their ‘reporting units’ and 
then assign the recorded goodwill to reporting units. A reporting unit is defined by 
FASB as the lowest level of business units for which discrete financial information is 
available.8 Once assignment of goodwill to reporting units is completed, an impairment 
test is performed at the reporting unit level.   
Under SFAS 142, the impairment test is carried out in two steps. In step one, a 
reporting unit’s carrying amount is compared to its fair value. To determine the fair 
value of a reporting unit, SFAS 142 allows the use of multiple valuation methodologies.9 
If the reporting unit’s carrying amount is less than its fair value, there is no impairment, 
                                                 
6
‘Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and Long-Lived Assets to be disposed of’ 
7
 According to FASB guidelines, interim testing between annual tests is necessary if there is:  (i) market 
decline, (ii) a regulatory action concerning the company’s business, (iii) a change in legal environment 
which impacts the company, (iv) unexpected competition, (v) loss of key personnel, (vi) expectation to sell 
or dispose a reporting unit. 
8
 Reporting units can be the firm’s operating segments identified under SFAS 131 or a component of an 
operating segment (SFAS 142, paragraph 30). 
9 
“Board members generally agreed that each of these methods (market capitalization, discounted cash 
flow, residual income valuation, cash flow return on investment, and economic value added) could be used 
to determine the fair value of a reporting unit...” (SFAS 142, paragraph 71). 
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and the test is complete. If the reporting unit’s carrying amount exceeds its fair value, 
then a potential impairment exists, and the company follows the procedures of the 
second step.  
In step two, the company estimates the implied fair value of the reporting unit’s 
goodwill by subtracting estimated fair values of the reporting unit’s identifiable net 
assets from the reporting unit’s estimated fair value. The difference is compared with the 
carrying amount of the goodwill. If the implied fair value is greater than the carrying 
amount of the goodwill, goodwill is not impaired and there is no impairment loss. If the 
implied fair value is less than the carrying amount of the goodwill, the company must 
record an impairment write-off equal to the difference. 
While SFAS 142 forces managers to perform a goodwill impairment test every 
year, it also provides them with several important accounting choices. The first 
accounting choice is the managerial flexibility with respect to the definition of reporting 
units. Under SFAS 142, a reporting unit does not have to be a specific component, 
division, branch or subsidiary.  
The second accounting choice provided by SFAS 142 is the managerial 
discretion with respect to the assessment of fair values, both at the level of reporting unit 
as a whole and at the level of net assets that comprises the reporting unit. In order to 
come up with fair value of reporting units both as a whole and as composition of 
identifiable assets, managers must use their judgment to forecast future performance, 
choose a proper discount rate, and assess replacement value of assets. Consequently, it 
has been argued that “management may selectively opt to ‘manage earnings’ through 
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cursory, rather than intensive review of goodwill asset impairment” (Massoud and 
Raiborn, 2003, p. 30). If managers have incentives to maximize or minimize goodwill 
impairment losses, they can be selective with respect to the underlying assumptions of 
their definitions of reporting units and fair value calculations in the impairment testing 
process. Thus, SFAS 142 provides managers with significant accounting discretion with 
respect to the probability, timing and amount of a loss recognition.  
2.2. Prior Literature 
Beatty and Weber (2006) examine the determinants of managers’ impairment 
charge decisions in the SFAS 142 transition period. The authors find that, in the 
transition period, firms accelerate goodwill impairment charges (and obtain below-the-
line accounting treatment) when their income from continuing operations has a higher 
stock market multiple. They also find that, in the transition period, firms delay 
impairment losses when their debt covenants are affected by below-the-line items, when 
they have bonus plans tied to financials, when their CEOs have longer tenure, and when 
they encounter financial based delisting requirements. 
This study differs from Beatty and Weber (2006) in several respects. First, Beatty 
and Weber (2006) test an association between financial based bonus plans and the 
transitional goodwill impairment loss. Extending Beatty and Weber (2006), I add the 
role of both stock option compensation and the board of directors on managers’ choice 
to recognize goodwill impairment losses subsequent to adoption period.  
Second, Beatty and Weber (2006) exclusively examine transitional goodwill 
impairment charges whereas I focus on goodwill impairment charges subsequent to the 
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adoption of SFAS 142. As noted earlier, the initial application of SFAS 142 was 
regarded as losses from a change in accounting principles and provided a one-time 
below-the-line treatment while impairment losses subsequent to the initial application of 
SFAS 142 are reflected ‘above-the-line’ in operating income. Hirschey and Richardson 
(2003, p.77) observe that ‘for many companies, such a one-time chance created a strong 
incentive to aggressively recognize goodwill impairment losses during fiscal year 2002 
(transition period).’ Thus, it is important to examine goodwill impairment losses 
subsequent to initial application of SFAS 142 because impairment losses subsequent to 
the transitional period are less likely to be affected by the managerial incentives specific 
to the transitional period. In the period subsequent to the transition to SFAS 142, the 
intensity and nature of managerial incentives and other determinants of impairment 
losses can change. While I focus on goodwill impairment losses subsequent to the 
transition period in my main analyses, I do analyze the transition period write-offs as an 
additional test (Section 6.1). 
Li et al. (2006) report downward revision of expectations and negative abnormal 
returns on the announcement of goodwill impairment losses. Bens and Heltzer (2006) 
document a negative market reaction to the announcements of goodwill write-offs during 
and subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 142. The implication of these results for my 
study is that if managers are concerned about possible negative repercussions of 
goodwill impairment losses for equity values, managers may intentionally use their 
discretion afforded by SFAS 142 to mislead financial statement users regarding the 
underlying value of reported goodwill. 
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As goodwill impairment losses are a subset of asset write-offs, the second related 
literature is the stream of research which examines asset write-offs. Asset write-offs 
generally result in negative price changes at the announcement (Strong and Meyer, 1987; 
Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Aboody, 1996; Bartov et al. 1998). Market reactions depend on 
the cash flow implications of the event leading to the write-off (Bunsis, 1997). Write-
offs appear to be reported in the fourth quarter (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Zucca and 
Campbell, 1992; Francis et al. 1996), which may be due to the annual audit or managers’ 
strategic choice with respect to the timing of write-offs (Alciatore et al.1998). 
Write-off firms tend to perform poorly both prior to and subsequent to the write-
off, relative to industry or control groups (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Rees et al.1996). 
Majority of write-offs are recorded when earnings were below expectations (Chen, 1991; 
Chen and Lee, 1995; Riedl, 2004). Some asset write-offs are recorded when earnings 
exceed expectations (Zucca and Campbell, 1992). Evidence in Strong and Meyer (1987) 
and Francis et al. (1996) indicates that write-off firms are more likely to have recent 
changes in management, suggesting that new management “clears the deck” at the 
beginning of its tenure with the firm. Finally, Riedl (2004) finds that write-offs of long-
lived assets reported in post SFAS 121 regime have significantly lower associations with 
economic factors and higher associations with reporting incentives.  
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3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Executives’ Incentives 
The recognition of goodwill impairments is theoretically a function of economic 
factors underlying the performance of the firm, reporting incentives of top executives, 
and oversight of the board of directors over the financial reporting process. In other 
words, conceptually, if managers detect that the value of a reporting unit’s net assets has 
declined below the carrying value, then they should record a goodwill impairment 
charge, based on the guidance provided by SFAS 142. However, consistent with the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), corporate executives, who are agents for 
equity holders and acting in their own self-interest, may or may not recognize goodwill 
impairment leading to possible wealth extraction from other parties to the firm. As 
Massoud and Raiborn (2003) argue, managers have the flexibility to calculate either 
impairment or non-impairment, based on their selected underlying assumptions. 
Furthermore, Watts (2003, p.218) recognizes that “assessing impairment (under SFAS 
142) requires valuation of future cash flows. Because those future cash flows are 
unlikely to be verifiable and contractible, they, and valuation based on them, are likely to 
be manipulated.” Agency theory predicts that by using this discretion afforded by the 
accounting standard, executives will transfer wealth from shareholders to themselves. 
Based on the managerial discretion allowed under the impairment approach and 
on related implications of agency theory, I consider the role of executives’ contractual 
and perceived reporting incentives on their use of discretion to recognize goodwill 
impairments. Bonus plans (which are directly linked to earnings) provide executives 
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with incentives to reduce goodwill impairment charges.10 By using the accounting 
discretion allowed under SFAS 142 opportunistically, executives may transfer wealth (in 
the form of higher bonus) from shareholders to themselves. Beatty and Weber (2006) 
document that having a bonus-based compensation plan that does not explicitly exclude 
special items reduces the probability of taking an SFAS 142 write-off by 22 percent. 
Focusing on goodwill impairment charges subsequent to the SFAS 142 adoption period, 
I predict that executives who have earnings-based bonus plans are less inclined to 
recognize goodwill impairment charges. 
I also consider perceived reporting incentives in connection with the stock price 
effects of goodwill impairments. Recording a goodwill impairment loss is likely to result 
in a decline in the value of expected future cash flows of the firms and a decrease in 
stock price. The findings of studies examining the market reaction to goodwill 
impairments confirm this prediction (Li et al. 2006; Bens and Heltzer, 2006). These 
studies document a negative market reaction to the announcement of goodwill 
impairment losses.  
Executives are likely to be particularly sensitive about a decrease in the firm’s 
stock price when their options are ‘in-the-money.’ When option holdings of executives 
are in the money, any decline in stock price would directly result in a reduction in 
executives’ wealth.  Prior  research  documents that  executives  with  substantial  option  
                                                 
10
 Bonus related incentives may not be uniform across firms. In other words, not all executives who have 
bonus plans may want to maximize reported income. There are generally caps on bonus plans and the 
effects on future-period earnings (i.e., earnings smoothing incentives) that need to be considered. Below, I 
consider the role of earnings smoothing incentives. 
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holdings are more likely to issue misstated accounting information (Cohen et al., 2005; 
Efendi et al., 2006). Accordingly, I predict that executives who have more in-the-money 
stock options are less inclined to recognize goodwill impairment charges.  
These arguments lead to the first two hypotheses (stated in alternative form): 
H1: Other things being equal, firms whose top executives have higher amounts of 
earnings based bonuses record lower goodwill impairment losses. 
H2: Other things being equal, firms whose top executives have higher amount of 
in-the-money exercisable options record lower goodwill impairment losses. 
While executives have incentives to understate (or simply not to recognize) 
goodwill impairments, they may also have incentives to overstate goodwill impairments. 
Prior literature shows that managers may use reporting discretion to take “big bath” 
charges and/or to “smooth” earnings (Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Massoud 
and Raiborn (2003) argue that executives may decide to record large goodwill write-offs 
when operations are at a downturn. The rationale of executives would be that taking an 
impairment loss could not make a significant difference in a period of downward trend. 
On the other hand, managers may take goodwill impairment losses during the periods in 
which actual earnings would have been substantially above expectations. In other words, 
given the subjectivity inherent in annual goodwill impairment testing process under 
SFAS 142, executives may take higher than the necessary economic impairment when 
their firms’ earnings are unexpectedly low (bath) and when their firm’s earnings are 
unexpectedly high (smoothing), misrepresenting the underlying economics of the firm. 
Thus, the third hypothesis is: 
  
17 
H3: Other things being equal, firms with unexpectedly low earnings and firms 
with unexpectedly high earnings record higher goodwill impairment losses. 
3.2. Board of Directors’ Control 
Although managers’ incentives to act opportunistically are likely to affect review 
of goodwill impairments, this behavior should be constrained by the oversight role of 
boards. Boards of directors are responsible for oversight of the financial reporting 
process. Prior research documents a positive association between the strength of 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality. For example, companies with 
independent members on the board are: (1) less likely to be involved in financial 
statement fraud (Beasley, 1996), (2) less likely to dismiss their auditor following the 
receipt of a first-time going concern opinion (Carcello and Neal, 2003), and (3) more 
likely to have higher audit fees (Abbott et al. 2003). Klein (2002) finds a negative 
association between board independence and the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
Krishnan (2005) documents that the quality of the audit committee is positively 
associated with the quality of corporate internal control. Finally, Ahmed and Duellman 
(2006) provide evidence that the quality of the board of directors is associated with 
conservative reporting choices. 
 Taken together, these studies imply that effective monitoring by board of 
directors is likely to reduce managerial opportunism associated with the goodwill 
impairment review process. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Other things being equal, there is a positive association between the strength 
of the board and the amount of recorded goodwill impairment losses. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Sample 
Panel A of table 1 outlines the sample selection process. In order to select my 
sample, I first identify COMPUSTAT firms with a goodwill balance at the beginning of 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Following Beatty and Weber (2006), I restrict the sample to 
firms with a difference between market and book value of equity that is less than their 
recorded goodwill, and thereby remove from the sample firms that have a remote 
probability of having to take a goodwill impairment charge.11 I retain only the firms that 
have December 31 year-end to ensure that my sample firms have passed the SFAS 142 
adoption period. This procedure results in 1,226 firms on COMPUSTAT that are 
relatively more likely to take goodwill write-offs. 
Of the 1,226 firms, I exclude 61 firms that are American Depository Receipts 
(ADR) firms and 113 firms that do not have necessary data available on COMPUSTAT 
to run my tests, reducing my sample to 1,052 firms. 
I then partition the data based on whether the firms took SFAS 142 write-offs. Of 
the 1,052 firms that are expected to take SFAS 142 write-off, 133 firms did take a SFAS 
142 write-off (“initial write-off sample”) while 919 firms did not take a SFAS 142 write-
off (“all potential no write-off sample”). To have a more powerful design and reduce the 
                                                 
11
 As explained in Section 2, under SFAS 142, goodwill is tested for impairment using a two-step process 
which begins with an estimation of the fair value of a reporting unit. The first step is a screen for potential 
impairment by comparing the reporting unit’s carrying amount to its fair value. If the reporting unit’s 
carrying amount exceeds its fair value, then a potential impairment exists, and the company follows the 
procedures of second step to measure the amount of impairment. Ideally, in empirical analyses, one should 
use reporting unit’s market value to book value to identify firms that are likely to take a write-off. Since 
reporting units and their ratios of market value to book value are not observable, similar to approach 
followed by Beatty and Weber (2006) I use firm-wide market to book comparison. 
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amount of hand-collected data, I match every firm in the initial write-off sample with a 
firm from the all potential no write-off sample based on year, industry, and size. More 
specifically, a matched firm is a firm from the dataset all potential no write-off sample 
which belongs to the same year, has the same two-digit SIC code (at a minimum) and is 
within 30% of the size (as measured by total assets) of a write-off firm. For three firms 
in the initial write-off sample, no matching firms exist among all potential no write-off 
sample with a match on size and industry. These procedures result in a final sample of 
260 firms, comprised of 130 write-off firms and 130 matching no write-off firms. 
I obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT. The transition period impairments 
are treated as the effect of accounting change, and therefore, they are not included in 
Compustat annual data item number 368, “impairments of goodwill”. Thus, I hand-
collected the SFAS 142 transition period impairment losses from 10-K reports. For 129 
firms, I was able to find executive compensation data (salary, bonus, options, and total 
compensation) in ExecuComp database. For the remaining 131 firms, I hand-collected 
the executive compensation data from firms’ proxy statements. Corporate governance 
data (percentage of inside directors, separate chair, directors who serve over four boards, 
directors who are active CEOs, outside directors’ ownership percentage, inside directors’ 
ownership percentage, institutional owners’ percentage) was available through the 
Corporate Library database for 111 firms. I hand-collected the corporate governance 
data from firms’ proxy statements for the rest of 149 firms.  
Panel B of table 1 details the industry composition of overall sample (domestic 
firms with a goodwill balance and were likely to take SFAS 142 write-offs). The 
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industry that is most heavily represented (20 percent of sample observations) is business 
services.  
4.2. Empirical Models 
I use the following general model to assess the determinants of goodwill 
impairment losses: 
Impair = f {economic determinants, executives’ incentives, board characteristics} 
First, I investigate firms’ decisions to take SFAS 142 goodwill impairment 
charge. Because the decision to recognize an impairment charge is a dichotomous 
choice, I use a dichotomous logistic model. Second, I examine the determinants of the 
percentage of goodwill that is written off using a tobit model. I use a tobit specification 
because when data are censored, a tobit specification is appropriate [Greene (2003)]. 
Since SFAS 142 does not allow for the recognition of increases in the economic value of 
goodwill, firms that experience an increase in the economic value of their goodwill 
cannot record such increases, causing my dependent variable to be censored at zero. 
Specifically, I use the following conditional logistic and tobit regressions to examine the 
effects of hypothesized incentives and constraints on executives’ SFAS 142 reporting 
choices: 
Impair t  = α + β1 ∆ROAt + β2 ∆ Salest + β3 B/Mt + β4 One Segmentt + β5 Sizet 
+ β6 Batht + β7 Smootht + β8 Debt Ratiot-1 + β9 CEO Changet 
+ β10 Bonust-1 + β11 In the Money Optionst-1 + β12 Inside Director %t  
+ β13 Separate Chairt + β14 Directors Over 4 Boardst  
+ β15 Directors Active CEOst + β16 Outside Director Ownership %t  
+ β17 Inside Director Ownership %t + β18 Institutional Holdings %t + ε   (1)   
 
 
  
21 
WO %
 t      = α + β1 ∆ ROAt + β2 ∆ Salest + β3 B/Mt + β4 One Segmentt + β5 Sizet 
+ β6 Batht + β7 Smootht + β8 Debt Ratiot-1 + β9 CEO Changet 
+ β10 Bonust-1+ β11 In the Money Optionst-1 
+ β12 Inside Director %t + β13 Separate Chairt + β14 Directors Over 4 Boardst  
+ β15 Directors Active CEOst+ β16 Outside Director Ownership %t  
+ β17 Inside Director Ownership %t + β18 Institutional Holdings %t + ε   (2)  
  
Impairt: A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm recorded an annual (non-
adoption period) goodwill impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t. 
WO %t: The dollar value of annual (non-adoption period) goodwill impairment 
loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t divided by the amount of goodwill at the end of t-1. 
∆ROAt: The percent change in return on assets for firm from period t-1 to t. 
∆Salest: The percent change in sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12) for firm from 
period t-1 to t. 
B/Mt: Book value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) divided by market value 
of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) at the end of t.  
One Segmentt: A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm has one business 
segment at the end of t, and zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT segment file). 
Sizet: Log of market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * 
COMPUSTAT data item 25) at the end of t. 
Batht: The proxy for “big bath” reporting, equal to the change in firm’s pre-write-
off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, if value of this 
variable negative, and zero otherwise. 
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Smootht: The proxy for “earnings smoothing” reporting, equal to the change in 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, 
if value of this variable positive, and zero otherwise. 
Debt Ratiot-1: Total liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 181) at the end of t-1 
divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) at the end of t-1. 
CEO Changet: An indicator variable equal to one if firm experiences a change in 
CEO from year t-2 to t, and zero otherwise. 
Bonust-1: Value of bonus compensation for the CEO at the end of t-1 divided by 
CEO’s salary at the end of t-1. 
In-the-Money Optionst-1: Value of in-the-money exercisable options for the CEO at 
the end of t-1 divided by CEO’s salary at the end of t-1. 
Inside Director %t: Percentage of directors who are currently employed or have 
been employed by the firm for the past three years, are related to current management, 
and/or are related to the firm-founder. 
Separate Chairt: An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is not chairman of 
the board, and zero otherwise. 
Directors over 4 Boardst: Sum of all directors with more than 4 corporate 
directorships on a firm’s board of directors. 
Directors Active CEOst: Sum of all directors on a board who are active CEOs of 
public or private companies. 
Outside Director Ownership%t: The common shares held by outside directors 
divided by total common shares outstanding. 
  
23 
Inside Director Ownership%t: The common shares held by inside directors divided 
by total common shares outstanding. 
Institutional Holdings %t: The common shares held by institutional investors 
divided by total common shares outstanding. 
4.2.1. Economic Factors 
The reliability of this study’s findings depends on the extent to which the 
research design controls for economic factors driving the phenomena under examination. 
Consequently, I include proxies for economic factors to capture the underlying value of 
firm’s goodwill. Ideally, all economic factors that influence managers’ unbiased 
expectations regarding the future performance of reporting units’ assets should be 
included. However, this is challenging for at least two reasons. First, managers’ 
expectations are not observable. Second, unless a firm is composed of only one reporting 
unit, there is no publicly available data at the reporting unit level. Consequently, similar 
to prior research (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006), I use 
empirical proxies to reflect manager’s expectations regarding the future performance of 
reporting units’ assets. 
The first set of variables includes the proxies designed to capture economic 
impairment of goodwill. I include two proxies for economic factors associated with firm-
specific prior performance and firm-specific changes in performance. Similar to Francis 
et al. (1996), I control for firm performance by including the change in return on assets 
(∆ROAt). ROA is measured by income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets. The worse the firm’s past performance, the higher the likelihood and 
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magnitude of annual goodwill impairment losses (Francis et al., 1996). Similar to Riedl 
(2004), ∆SALESt, the percent change in sales for firm from prior year is included to 
capture the change in firm performance. Both variables have predicted negative signs. 
I include book-to-market ratio (B/Mt) in the model (i) to capture the intensity of 
the expected economic impairment of goodwill and (ii) to proxy for growth options. 
Following FASB guidelines, firms with excess amount of book value over market value 
(both measured at reporting unit level) are more likely to incur goodwill impairment 
charges. Thus, book-to-market ratio provides an indication of a possible SFAS 142 
impairment at the firm level. Furthermore, Beatty and Weber (2006) argue that firms 
with more growth options are less likely to have impaired goodwill; therefore, they are 
less likely to take annual goodwill impairment charges. This assumption is plausible 
because the goodwill impairment test under SFAS 142 requires managers to consider not 
only backward-looking but also forward-looking information when they evaluate 
goodwill for impairment. Consequently, I include B/Mt as a forward-looking construct, 
reflecting the larger information set available to managers. I measure this construct by 
dividing the book value of equity and market value of equity. I expect a positive 
association between B/Mt and reported annual goodwill impairment charges.  
I include a variable to capture the likelihood of goodwill impairment related to 
firms’ organizational structure (One Segmentt). At the extreme, for a firm with only one 
reporting unit, no allocation of goodwill balance among reporting units is necessary. As 
such, an avenue for opportunistic managerial discretion through goodwill allocation is 
eliminated for firms with one reporting unit (Beatty and Weber, 2006). Consequently, 
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firms with one reporting unit might be more likely to record existing goodwill 
impairment. On the other hand, a firm with more reporting units might incur higher 
annual goodwill impairment losses because higher complexity of the organization would 
make it harder to achieve the optimum coordination among asset groups, leading to 
possible goodwill impairment losses. As a result, I do not predict a sign on One 
Segmentt. 
Finally, similar to Francis et al. (1996) and Beatty and Weber (2006), I control 
for firms’ public exposure and any disclosure biases that may arise from it. Thus, I 
include a measure of the size of the firm. I define Sizet as the log of total assets in the 
year of write-off. I do not predict a sign on Sizet. 
4.2.2. Proxies for Executives’ Incentives 
 The second group of proxies is designed to incorporate reporting incentives of 
managers in their decision to recognize annual goodwill impairment losses. To capture 
the impact of executives’ bonus compensation, I include Bonust-1, value of bonus 
compensation for the CEO at the beginning of the SFAS 142 write-off year divided by 
CEO’s salary at the beginning of the SFAS 142 write-off year. Consistent with my first 
hypothesis, I expect a negative association between CEOs’ bonus compensation and the 
SFAS 142 write-offs.  
 To capture the effects of executives’ concerns for the value of their stock options, I 
define In-the-Money Options
 t-1, value of in-the-money exercisable options for the CEO 
at the beginning of the SFAS 142 write-off year divided by CEO’s salary at the 
beginning of the SFAS 142 write-off year. Consistent with executives’ incentives to 
  
26 
support the stock price, thereby the value of their in-the-money exercisable stock options 
(the second hypothesis), I predict a negative association between SFAS 142 write-offs 
and this variable. 
 To incorporate managers’ incentives to take big bath charges and/or earnings 
smoothing behavior, I include proxies for when earnings are unexpectedly high and 
unexpectedly low. Following Francis et al. (1996) and Riedl (2004), I define the variable 
Batht as follows. I calculate the change in firm’s pre-write-off earnings from prior year, 
and divide it by total assets at the end of prior year. If the value of this variable negative, 
I include the value as it is. On the other hand, if the value is non-negative, I code it as 
zero. Similarly, I define the variable Smootht as the change in firm’s pre-write-off 
earnings from prior year, divided by total assets at the end of prior year, if value of this 
variable positive, and zero otherwise. Consistent with hypothesis 3, I expect a positive 
(negative) sign on Smootht (Batht). 
I control for some other reporting incentives identified by prior literature. 
Consistent with Riedl (2004) and Beatty and Weber (2006), I incorporate into the model 
a proxy for managers’ incentives in relation to the existing debt covenants. On the one 
hand, managers may follow income-increasing accounting choices in attempt to avoid 
costly violations of debt covenants. On the other hand, existing debt covenants may 
introduce higher scrutiny on financial reporting process including the exercise of 
accounting discretion with respect to SFAS 142 impairment testing. I measure Debt 
Ratiot-1 as total liabilities at the beginning of write-off year divided by total assets at the 
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beginning of write-off year. Because of the competing effects, I do not have a priori 
prediction on the coefficient of this variable. 
Consistent with prior research (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl 2004; Beatty and 
Weber, 2006), I control for the probability that the decision to recognize a SFAS 142 
write-off will be affected by a change in top management. Prior literature suggests that a 
new CEO may take a more critical examination over the existing assets. This could be 
the case either because of a shift in firm’s strategic focus after the new management or a 
managerial incentive to attribute potential charges to the prior management with the 
hope of lowering the benchmark against which the new management will be compared 
to the prior management. Therefore, I expect that CEO Changet is positively associated 
with the likelihood of taking SFAS 142 goodwill impairment.  
4.2.3. Proxies for Board of Directors’ Control 
 I use five proxies for the effectiveness of board as a monitoring mechanism for 
managers’ choice to recognize existing annual goodwill impairments: (1) percentage of 
inside directors on the board (Inside Director %t), (2) separation of CEO and chairman 
positions (Separate Chairt), (3) number of directors serving over four boards (Directors 
over 4 Boardst), (4) number of directors who are active CEOs (Directors Active CEOst), 
and (5) outside director ownership (Outside Director Ownership %t). 
I include Inside Director %t and Separate Chairt in the model as surrogates for 
the independence of board of directors. Prior research provides evidence that one of the 
most important determinants of directors’ effectiveness is their independence from the 
management. Impaired independence of directors results in less effective oversight, 
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which may allow executives opportunistically determine the accounting choice with 
respect to recognition of existing goodwill impairment. As a result, I define Inside 
Director %t as percentage of directors who are currently employed or have been 
employed by the firm for the past three years, are related to current management, and/or 
are related to the firm-founder. Separate Chairt is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the CEO is not chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. I expect a 
negative association between Inside Director %t and the SFAS 142 annual impairment 
charges and positive association between Separate Chairt and the SFAS 142 annual 
impairment charges. 
I measure the sum of all directors with more than four corporate directorships on 
a firm’s board of directors to proxy for the effectiveness of the monitoring by the board 
of directors. Prior research suggests that serving on numerous boards can result in over-
committed directors who may not be effective monitors on any board.12 Similar to 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2005), I use a cutoff of four for the number of boards 
concurrently served as the metric because there is a wide dispersion in the number of 
board seats held by directors making an alternative metric such as average number of 
directorships a noisy measure. I expect a negative association between Directors over 4 
Boardst and the SFAS 142 annual impairment charges. 
As an additional proxy for over-commitment and independence of directors, I 
include Directors Active CEOst , which is defined as the sum of all directors on a board 
                                                 
12
 For example, Beasley (1996), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2005). 
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who are active CEOs of other public or private companies. Directors, who are active 
CEOs may not be optimally independent of management’s views. Therefore, this 
variable serves as an additional proxy for the independence of directors. I expect a 
negative association between Directors Active CEOst and the SFAS 142 impairment 
charges. 
I use Outside Director Ownership %t, the percentage of outstanding common 
shares held by outside directors as a proxy for the strength of their monitoring 
incentives. Prior research provides evidence that, in general, outside director ownership 
enhances monitoring incentives of board of directors. For example, larger directors’ 
ownership percentage is associated with lower likelihood of financial statement fraud 
(Beasley, 1996) and higher bond ratings (Ashbaugh et al. 2004). I expect a positive 
association between Outside Director Ownership %t and the SFAS 142 impairment 
charges. 
I control for the percentage of ownership held by inside directors because insider 
ownership may impact accounting choices of the firm. ‘Convergence of interests’ 
hypothesis in Jensen (1993) suggests that insider shareholdings help align the interests of 
shareholders and managers. However, Morck et al. (1988) and Kole (1995) provide 
evidence that while the convergence of interest hypothesis holds over smaller and larger 
insider ownership ranges, over the medium insider range (generally 5-25%), there is a 
negative relation between firm value and insider ownership, which is consistent with 
‘entrenchment hypothesis’. Over this medium range, private benefits of agency driven 
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decisions outweigh the costs to insiders in terms of value loss from suboptimal choices. 
Due to the competing effects, I do not predict a sign on the coefficient of this variable. 
I also control for the institutional ownership because prior research views 
institutional owners as an alternative governance mechanism, which actively or 
passively monitor management’s actions. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that 
institutional owners, by virtue of their large stockholdings, would have incentives to 
monitor management since they have greater benefits through this monitoring and have 
greater voting power which makes it easier to take corrective action when it is necessary. 
Consistent with this theory, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms that have 
greater institutional ownership enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new 
bond issues. On the other hand, other studies argue that institutional investors have 
limited incentives to monitor management actions because of free-riding problem (e.g., 
Admati et al. 1994). Because of the competing theories, I do not have a priori prediction 
on the coefficient of this variable. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for write-off and no write-off sample.13 I 
find that the mean goodwill write-off is 29% of the beginning of the period goodwill 
balance. On average, goodwill constitutes 23% of total assets for write-off firms, which 
does not differ at normal probability levels from the mean of 21.6 % for no write-off 
firms. As expected given my sample selection criteria, write-off firms match the no 
write-off firms closely on size and industry specific changes. 
Operating performance statistics indicate that neither write-off firms nor no-
write-off firms exhibit strong financial performance. This result is expected as the 
sample selection process retains only those firms which are expected to take a write-off. 
Furthermore, summary statistics indicate that write-off firms perform poorly relative to 
the no write-off firms. The median ∆ROAt from the year prior to write-off is -6.4 % for 
write-off firms versus -0.4% no write-off firms. Reflected also in significantly lower 
means and medians for ∆Salest, write-off firms exhibit worse financial performance 
relative to no write-off firms. There are no differences between two categories firms in 
terms of their B/Mt and One Segmentt. 
Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics related to the variables designed to 
capture executives’ reporting incentives. Compared to no write-off firms, write-off firms 
have significantly stronger downward trend in their earnings, which is indicated by 
                                                 
13
 Continuous variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% in order to eliminate the effects of 
extreme observations. The inferences are similar without any winsorization. 
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lower Batht for these firms. Consistent with prior research, write-off firms have 
significantly higher rates of CEO turnover within two-year period prior to the write-off. 
On the other hand, CEOs in no write-off firms, compared to CEOs in write-off firms, 
have higher values of bonus and in-the-money options as proportion of their salary. 
Smootht and Debt Ratiot-1 do not statistically differ between two categories of firms.  
Table 2 also provides descriptive statistics related to the governance-related 
variables. Write-off firms and no write-off firms match very closely on board size and 
the percentage of institutional ownership. No write-off firms, however, have 
significantly less independent boards, with 31.4% inside directors as compared to 22.4% 
for write-off firms. Similarly, no write-off firms, compared to write-off firms, have 
higher incidence of CEOs also holding the title of chairman titles (34.6% of no write-off 
firms and 56.1% of write-off firms have CEO and chair separation). The number of 
directors who serve over four boards is higher in no write-off firms, compared to write-
off firms, indicating that the extent of over-commitment on the part of directors differs 
across two categories of firms. While outside director ownership percentage is 
significantly higher in write-off firms, inside director ownership percentage is 
significantly higher in no write-off firms. There are no differences between write-off and 
no write-off firms in terms of the number of active CEOs serving on their boards. 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations among variables. Several of the reporting 
incentives-related variables (Batht, Bonust-1, and In-the-Money Optionst-1) are correlated 
with SFAS 142 impairment charges in the predicted direction. Majority of governance 
variables (Inside Director %t, Separate Chairt, Directors over 4 Boardst, and Outside 
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Director Ownership%t) are also correlated with SFAS 142 impairment charges in the 
predicted direction.  
5.2. Determinants of the Decision to Take an SFAS 142 Write-off 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression examining the determinants 
of the decision to take an SFAS 142 write-off. The likelihood ratio Chi-square is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 probability level. The pseudo R-square is 41%.  
I find that the probability of taking an SFAS 142 goodwill write-off is higher for 
firms that have poorer financial performance as indicated by significantly negative signs 
on ∆ROAt and ∆Salest. As expected, firms with higher B/Mt are more likely to take a 
write-off. I also find that firms that are larger are more likely to take a write-off. 
However, there is no association between One Segmentt and the likelihood of taking a 
write-off.14  
For the reporting incentive proxies, Bonust-1 is significantly negative, providing 
evidence consistent with my first hypothesis. I find that CEOs with greater bonus values 
in relation to their salary in the year prior to the write-off are less likely to take SFAS 
142 write-offs. This result is consistent with Beatty and Weber (2006) in that managers 
behave as if they expect their bonus plans will be affected by recognizing SFAS 142 
write-offs.  
Providing strong support for my second hypothesis, In-the-Money Optionst-1 is 
highly significant with a Chi-square statistic of 4.914 (significant at the 0.01 level). The 
                                                 
14
 As explained in Section 6, I alternatively include a continuous measure of the segment variable (number 
of segments) and obtain similar results. 
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marginal effects on In-the-Money Optionst-1 indicate that for a one standard deviation 
increase in this variable,
 
other things equal, the odds of a firm taking a SFAS 142 write-
off are decreased by 32.6%.15 This result is consistent with the negative prediction 
implied by Efendi et al. (2006) and Cohen et al. (2005). The results from these two 
papers indicate that executives with substantial option holdings have incentives to issue 
misstated accounting information. The results from my analysis indicate that executives 
postpone goodwill impairment charges in order to protect their wealth in their option 
holdings. 
Smootht is significantly positive indicating that firms are more likely to take 
SFAS 142 write-offs when they have unusually high earnings. Although the downward 
trend in earnings (Batht) is negatively associated with the likelihood of taking SFAS 142 
write-off as expected, it is not statistically significant. Overall, I find only partial support 
for my third hypothesis.  
I also find a statistically significant positive coefficient on the CEO Changet 
variable, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). When 
there is a change in senior management, firms are more likely to take SFAS 142 
goodwill impairment charges. The coefficient on Debt Ratiot-1 is negative and 
                                                 
15
 I also examine whether the results for compensation-related variables (bonus and in the money options) 
are sensitive to the choice of the scaling factor. Alternatively, I deflate each compensation variable by 
Total Compensationt-1, where Total Compensation is defined as all compensation including option grants. 
The mean and median values of Bonust-1 to Total Compensationt-1 and In the Money Optionst-1 to Total 
Compensationt-1 are significantly larger for no write-off firms, compared to the write-off firms. In 
untabulated sensitivity analyses, I re-run my regression models using Bonust-1 to Total Compensationt-1 
and In the Money Optionst-1. The results from these analyses are essentially similar to those reported in 
tables 4 and 5. However, scaling by salary rather than total compensation is more appropriate for my tests 
because I have separate hypotheses for incentives related to bonuses and options. Since salary includes 
none of those components, it provides cleaner tests for my hypotheses. 
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insignificant, consistent with the result for the related variable in Beatty and Weber 
(2006). 
Consistent with the fourth hypothesis, the results indicate strong associations 
between the likelihood of taking SFAS 142 write-offs and firms’ governance 
characteristics. The coefficient on Inside Director %t is negative and significant at the 
1% level. In terms of economic significance, for a one standard deviation increase in 
Inside Director %t, other things equal, the odds of a firm taking a SFAS 142 write-off 
are decreased by 25.3%. The coefficient on Separate Chairt is positive and significant at 
5% level. These results are consistent with the notion that the decision to recognize 
SFAS 142 goodwill impairment is associated with higher director independence.  
I also find that the number of directors who serve over four boards is negatively 
related to the likelihood of taking a write-off implying that over-commitment on the part 
of directors decreases the amount of monitoring received from these directors. For a one 
standard deviation increase in Directors Over 4 Boardst, other things equal, the odds of a 
firm taking a SFAS 142 write-off are decreased by 40.2%. 
The coefficient on Directors Active CEOst is also negative as expected but it is 
not statistically significant. This is most likely because of the high correlation between 
this variable and Directors over 4 Boardst. Consistent with my prediction that 
monitoring incentives of outside directors are positively associated with the decision to 
take a SFAS 142 write-off, the coefficient on Outside Director Ownership%t is positive 
and significant at 1% level. Specifically, for a one standard deviation increase in Outside 
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Director Ownership %t, other things equal, the odds of a firm taking a SFAS 142 write-
off are increased by 35.8%. 
The coefficient on Inside Director Ownership %t is negative and insignificant 
implying that insider ownership is not associated with SFAS 142 write-off decisions. 
The coefficient on Institutional Holdings %t, as a control for an alternative governance 
mechanism, is also negative and insignificant. This result indicates that institutional 
owners do not seem to play an active monitoring role in executives’ decisions to 
recognize SFAS 142 write-offs. 
5.3. Determinants of the Percentage of Goodwill Written off 
Table 5 reports the results of the censored regression (tobit) model examining the 
determinants of the percentage of goodwill written off. This analysis yields similar 
results to those reported in the logistic analysis. There are three differences between the 
results of two types of analyses. First, the variable of downward trend in earnings (Batht) 
becomes highly significant in the predicted direction in the censored regression. Second, 
the dichotomous variable Separate Chairt is insignificant in the censored regression. 
This is consistent with the notion that while the incidence of CEO and chair separation 
affects the decision to take a write-off, it does not affect the extent of goodwill written 
off. Finally, the coefficient on ∆Salest is insignificant while it has the predicted sign. 
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6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
6.1. Changes Analyses 
In the previous section, I provide evidence that in the years subsequent to the 
adoption of SFAS 142, the likelihood of recognizing the existing impairment losses 
(equation 1) and the amount of goodwill written off (equation 2) are (1) positively 
associated with the strength of firms’ corporate governance, and (2) negatively 
associated with the executives’ holdings of in-the-money stock options and bonuses.  
Although equations (1) and (2) permit testing the hypothesized associations, they 
have two potential limitations. First, the choices that firms make in the transition period 
may impact firms’ decisions to take impairment charges in the subsequent periods, and it 
is possible that the differences between the write-off and no write-off firms (as presented 
in Section 5) might be driven by the impact of firms’ transition period choices on the 
subsequent period. More specifically, the SFAS 142 transition period provides firms 
with three reporting options: in the transition period, firms could choose to (1) report 
existing impairment losses in a timely and unbiased manner; (2) accelerate impairment 
charges (“transition period-accelerated firms”) and obtain below the line treatment 
(thereby avoid future charges to core earnings); (3) delay impairment charges 
(“transition period-delayed firms”), potentially indefinitely, but face the risk of 
recognizing impairment losses as a charge to their core earnings. Thus, an important 
question is whether the write-off firms in my sample are predominantly “transition 
period-delayed firms,” and the no write-off firms are predominantly “transition period-
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accelerated firms”. If it is the case, the results presented in Section 5 might be driven by 
firms’ transition period choices.  
The second limitation is that equations (1) and (2) do not address the issue of 
why the write-off firms did not take a below-the-line write-off in the transition period 
but chose to wait and recognize a charge to core earnings in the subsequent period.  
In order to address these issues, I categorize the sample firms based on their 
choices across the SFAS 142 transition and post-transition periods. Then, for each 
category, I examine what changes occur in various aspects of firm economics, 
compensation variables, and governance structures in the period leading up to the post-
adoption period SFAS 142 write-off.  
As presented in table 6, I identify the following categories of firms based on the 
interaction of their choices across SFAS 142 transition and post-transition periods: 
(1) Timely write-off firms are the firms that (a) were expected16 to take a write-off 
both in the transition and the subsequent period and did take write-offs both in the 
transition and subsequent periods, and (b) were not expected to take a write-off in the 
transition period and did not take a write-off in the transition period; and were expected 
to take a write-off in the subsequent period and did take a write-off in the subsequent 
period (categories a and b represent 75 out of 130 write-off firms). 
                                                 
16
 As explained in Section 4, the expectation model that I use to identify the firms that are likely to take 
write-off is based on the firm-wide market to book comparison, similar to approach followed by Beatty 
and Weber (2006). A firm is expected to take a write-off, if the difference between its market value and 
book value is less than its recorded goodwill.  
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(2) Delayed write-off firms are the firms that were expected to take a write-off in 
the transition period; did not take a write-off in the transition period but took a write-off 
in the subsequent period (55 out of 130 write-off firms). 
(3) Postponing (no write-off) firms are the firms that (a) were expected to take a 
write-off in the transition period, and did not take a write-off in the transition and 
subsequent periods; (b) were expected to take a write-off in the subsequent period, and 
did not take a write-off in the subsequent periods (categories a and b represent 123 out of 
130 no write-off firms).  
(4) Acceleration (no write-off) firms are firms that were not expected to take a 
write-off in the transition period; did take a substantial write-off in the transition period; 
and did not take a write-off in the subsequent period (7 out of 130 no write-off firms). 
The results of descriptive analyses on the change in governance variables 
(reported in table 7) indicate that during the era from the SFAS 142 transition period to 
the subsequent period, there have been more favorable changes in corporate governance 
structures of the write-off firms, compared to that of no write-off firms. On average, 
write-off firms, compared to no write-off firms, were more active in reducing the 
percentage of inside directors, the number of busy directors, and the number of directors 
who are active CEOs (p value of 0.05 or better). Similarly, in the same period, more 
write-off firms compared to no write-off firms separated their Chairman and CEO 
positions (p value of 0.001). These favorable changes in governance structures occurred 
to a greater extent in delayed write-off firms compared to the timely write-off firms.  
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Table 7 shows that in the period from t-2 to t-1, the mean change in the value of 
in-the-money options is significantly positive for no write-off firms while it is negative 
for write-off firms. The mean change in bonus values is significantly positive for timely 
write-off firms and for each category of no write-off firms while it is negative for 
delayed write-off firms. These results are consistent with the notion that executives’ 
motivation to protect the value of their compensation plays an important role in firms’ 
decisions to recognize SFAS 142 write-offs.  
Table 7 also shows that in the period prior to the write-off, both timely write-off 
and delayed write-off firms experience a CEO change more than each category of no 
write-off firms did. Additionally, the results show that the mean CEO change variable 
for delayed write-off firms is higher than that for timely write-off firms. This result 
suggests that one of the reasons why the delayed write-off firms do not take a below-the-
line write-off in the transitional period but take an above-the-line write-off in subsequent 
period is the change in reporting strategy introduced by new CEOs in such firms. 
Additionally, I perform multivariate tests using the following changes 
specifications:  
∆ Impair t  = α + β1 ∆ ROAt + β2 ∆ Salest + β3 ∆ B/Mt + β4 ∆ Sizet 
+ β5 Batht + β6 Smootht + β7 ∆ Debt Ratiot-1 + β8 CEO Changet 
+ β9 ∆ Bonust-1 + β10 ∆ In the Money Optionst-1  
+ β11 ∆ Inside Director %t + β12 ∆ Separate Chairt  
+ β13 ∆ Directors Over 4 Boardst + β14 ∆ Directors Active CEOst 
+ β15 ∆ Outside Director Ownership %t+ β16 ∆ Inside Director Ownership %t 
+ β17 ∆ Institutional Holdings %t + ε    (3)   
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∆ WO %
 t      = α + β1 ∆ ROAt + β2 ∆ Salest + β3 ∆ B/Mt + β4 ∆ Sizet 
+ β5 Batht + β6 Smootht + β7 ∆ Debt Ratiot-1 + β8 CEO Changet 
+ β9 ∆ Bonust-1 + β10 ∆ In the Money Optionst-1  
+ β11 ∆Inside Director %t + β12 ∆Separate Chairt  
+ β13 ∆ Directors Over 4 Boardst + β14 ∆ Directors Active CEOst 
+ β15 ∆Outside Director Ownership %t + β16 ∆Inside Director Ownership %t 
+ β17 ∆ Institutional Holdings %t + ε    (4)   
 
∆ Impairt: A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm recorded a goodwill 
impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t and did not record a goodwill 
impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t-1, zero otherwise. 
∆ WO %t: Annual change in the dollar value goodwill impairment loss under 
SFAS 142 at the end of t divided by the amount of goodwill at the end of t-1. 
∆ROAt: The percent change in return on assets for firm from period t-1 to t. 
∆Salest:The percent change in sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12) for firm from 
period t-1 to t. 
∆B/Mt: Annual change in book value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) to 
market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) at 
the end of t. 
∆Sizet: Annual change in log of market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 
199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) at the end of t. 
Batht: The proxy for “big bath” reporting, equal to the change in firm’s pre-write-
off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, if value of this 
variable negative, and zero otherwise. 
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Smootht: The proxy for “earnings smoothing” reporting, equal to the change in 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, 
if value of this variable positive, and zero otherwise. 
∆Debt Ratiot-1: Annual change in total liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 181) 
divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) at the end of t-1. 
CEO Changet: An indicator variable equal to one if firm experiences a change in 
CEO from year t-2 to t, and zero otherwise. 
∆Bonust-1: Change in the ratio of CEO’s bonus compensation to CEO’s salary 
from the end of t-2 to the end of t-1. 
∆In-the-Money Optionst-1: Change in the ratio of in-the-money exercisable options 
for the CEO to CEO’s salary from the end of t-2 to the end of t-1. 
∆Inside Director %t: Annual change in the percentage of directors who are 
currently employed or have been employed by the firm for the past three years, are 
related to current management, and/or are related to the firm-founder. 
∆Separate Chairt: Annual change in the indicator variable Separate Chair which is 
equal to one if the CEO is not chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. 
∆Directors over 4 Boardst: Annual change in sum of all directors with more than 4 
corporate directorships on a firm’s board of directors. 
∆Directors Active CEOst: Annual change in sum of all directors on a board who 
are active CEOs of public or private companies. 
∆Outside Director Ownership%t: Annual change in the ratio of the common shares 
held by outside directors to total common shares outstanding. 
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∆Inside Director Ownership%t: Annual change in the ratio of the common shares 
held by inside directors to total common shares outstanding. 
∆Institutional Holdings %t: Annual change in the ratio of the common shares held 
by institutional investors to total common shares outstanding. 
The estimation results for the changes models, presented in tables 8 and 9, are 
consistent with the results of the descriptive analyses and the levels models. The results 
presented in table 8 provide evidence that ∆ Inside Director %t, ∆ Separate Chairt, ∆ 
Directors over 4 Boardst, and ∆ Outside Director Ownership %t are significant (p value 
of 0.01 or less) in explaining the change in the likelihood of SFAS 142 write-off 
decision. The coefficient on ∆ Directors Active CEOst is statistically insignificant 
indicating that the change in number of directors who are active CEOs is not associated 
with the change in change in the likelihood of SFAS 142 write-off decision. 
The coefficients on ∆ Bonust-1 and ∆ In-the-Money Optionst-1 are negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that firms are less likely to change their SFAS 142 
behavior to write-off decision from no write-off decision when there are positive 
changes in their CEO compensation variables in the prior period. 
 The coefficients on the control variables generally have the predicted signs. As 
expected, positive changes in ROA and sales are associated with negative changes in 
SFAS 142 behavior (to no write-off decision from write-off decision). Although the 
change in book to market ratio has the predicted sign, it is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels in explaining the change in the likelihood of SFAS 142 write-off 
  
44 
decision. Similarly, the coefficients on Batht and Smootht are as expected but have no 
significance at conventional levels.  
Table 9 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression model 
examining the determinants of the change in percentage of goodwill written off. This 
analysis yields similar results to those reported in table 8. Major differences between the 
results of two types of analyses are as follows. First, the variable of downward trend and 
upward trend in earnings (Batht and Smootht) are highly significant in the predicted 
direction. Second, the variables CEO Change and ∆ Outside Director Ownership %t is 
insignificant in this model. This is consistent with the notion that while the change in 
CEO and the change in stock ownership of outside directors impact the change in 
decision to take a write-off, these variables do not affect the change in percentage of 
goodwill written off.  
To summarize, the results of descriptive analyses and changes models provide 
evidence that annual change in governance variables of main interest are generally 
significant (p value of 0.10 or better) in predicted direction in explaining the change in 
the likelihood of SFAS 142 write-off decision. These results are consistent with the 
notion that favorable changes in corporate governance induce firms to take SFAS 142 
impairment losses which managers avoided taking in the transition period. 
The results of frequency analysis (partitioning sample firms by whether they did 
take transition period write-offs or not and by whether they did take subsequent period 
write-offs or not) imply that transition period charges may affect firms’ propensity to 
take a write-off in the subsequent period. More specifically, for 55 firms in write-off 
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sample which delayed the recognition of the transition period charges, it is plausible that 
their transition period behavior significantly affected their likelihood of taking a write-
off in the subsequent period. Similarly, for 7 firms in the no write-off sample which 
accelerated the recognition of the transition period charges, it is plausible that their 
transition period behavior significantly affected their likelihood of not taking a write-off 
in the subsequent period. These firms together make up of 24% of the sample. Thus, for 
about 24% of the sample, transition period charges may affect firms’ propensity to take a 
write-off in the subsequent period. Although this analysis suggests that the results are 
unlikely to be driven by the firms’ transition period choices, I control for firms’ 
transition period behavior in the primary multivariate analyses.  
In order to control for firms’ transition period choices, I define four variables: (1) 
transition write-offt-1 : an indicator variable 1 if the firm recognized a SFAS 142 
transition period write-off, 0 otherwise, (2) transition write-off %t-1 : the amount of 
SFAS 142 transition period write-off as a proportion of beginning of the period 
goodwill, (3) acceleration no write-off firm: an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if 
the firm is of acceleration no write-off firm category, 0 otherwise, and (4) delayed write-
off firm:  an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is of delayed write-off firm 
category and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on transition write-offt-1 and transition write-
off %t-1 are unclear a priori. Consistent with the prior literature (Francis et al. 1996), 
firms that recognize write-offs may recognize additional write-offs in the post-transition 
period. This would imply positive coefficients on transition write-offt-1 and transition 
write-off %t-1. On the other hand, if firms accelerate SFAS 142 transition period write-
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offs then they are less likely to recognize post-transition period SFAS 142 write-offs. 
This would imply negative coefficients on transition write-offt-1 and transition write-off 
%t-1.  
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics relating to SFAS 142 transition period 
write-off variables across write-off and no write-off sub-samples. Approximately, 25% of 
write-off firms recognize transition period charges while 16% of no write-off firms 
transition period charges. The transition period charges are, on average, 15% of the 
beginning of the period goodwill for write-off firms and 13% of the beginning of the 
period goodwill for no write-off firms. 
I re-estimate equation (1) alternatively incorporating two transition period related 
variables as additional factors: (1) transition write-offt-1 and (2) indicator variables of 
acceleration no write-off firm and delayed write-off firm. Table 11 presents the results of 
this analysis, which are similar to those previously reported. The coefficient estimate on 
transition write-offt-1 is positive and not significant at conventional levels. Alternative 
specifications incorporating indicator variables of acceleration no write-off firm and 
delayed write-off firm (excluding transition write-offt-1) produce similar results.  
Additionally, I re-estimate equation (2) alternatively incorporating two transition 
period related variables as additional factors: (1) transition write-off %t-1 and (2) 
transition period charges of acceleration no write-off firm and delayed write-off firm. 
The results in table 12 are similar to those previously reported. The coefficient estimate 
on transition write-off%t-1 is positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficients 
on the variables of interest are essentially similar to those reported earlier except that 
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Bonust-1 is not significant at conventional levels. Other specifications including 
transition charge variables of acceleration no write-off firm and delayed write-off firm 
(excluding transition write-offt-1) produce similar results. Overall, the results are robust 
to inclusion of the variables which capture firms’ transition period behavior. 
6.2. Alternative Explanations 
A firm with poor performance over the past several periods is more likely to take 
a goodwill write-off because of underlying economics. Managers of such firms are also 
likely to receive low bonuses, and so a negative relation between bonuses and write-offs 
can result not necessarily because of reporting incentives but because of poor 
performance over a sustained period. I attempt to disentangle these competing 
explanations by re-estimating equation (1) and equation (2) incorporating two measures 
of accounting and stock price performance as additional economic factors: (1) ∆ROA5t, 
measured as the mean change in firm’s return on assets ratio over firm’s fiscal years t-5 
to t-1, and (2) Return5t, measured as the mean of firm’s stock return over firm’s fiscal 
years from t-5 to t-1. I follow Francis et al. (1996) and Riedl (2004) in choosing my 
proxies for past accounting and stock price performance. Assuming that these metrics 
capture long-term economic performance, the predicted sign for each variable is 
negative.  
The results reported in tables 13 and 14 indicate that past economic performance 
variables have negative associations with the likelihood and amount of SFAS 142 write-
offs, however, only Return5t is significant at conventional levels. In the Money Optionst-
1 continues to have negative associations with the likelihood and amount of SFAS 142 
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write-offs (p-value of 0.05 or better) in all specifications incorporating past performance 
variables. Bonust-1 has negative associations with the likelihood and amount of SFAS 
142 write-offs in specifications incorporating ∆ROA5t. However, Bonust-1 has no 
significant associations with the likelihood and amount of SFAS 142 write-offs at 
conventional significance levels in specifications incorporating Return5t. Alternative 
specifications incorporating these variables [e.g. replacing ∆ROAt and ∆ROA5t with 
Returnt (the mean of firm’s stock return over firm’s fiscal year t) and Return5t] result in 
similar inferences (not reported). Additionally, using return of the 12-month period 
ending three months following the firm’s fiscal year end does not alter the inferences.   
In his discussion of Beatty and Weber (2006), Bens (2006) notes the possibility 
of a self- selection issue involving the bonus variable and the likelihood of SFAS 142 
write-off recognition. According to this argument, firms with earnings-based bonus 
plans may be less likely to take an impairment charge because such firms may have 
lesser amount of goodwill to begin with. In order to address this possibility, I examine 
the relation between bonus values and goodwill balances in the year prior to the write-
off. The results indicate that firms with above the median bonust-1, on average, have 
significantly higher goodwillt-1 balances than firms with below the median bonust-1, 
which runs counter to above argument. Thus, the results on the compensation variables 
are unlikely to be driven a relation between any of the compensation variables and 
goodwill balances. 17 
                                                 
17
 Since the same argument can be considered for In the Money Options
 t-1 variable as well, I perform the 
same analysis for this variable. Similarly, the results indicate that firms with above the median In the 
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6.3. Additional Control Variables and Specification Checks 
Although current regulations prohibit auditors from conducting SFAS 142 
impairment testing for their clients, auditors may constrain some of managerial 
discretion by requiring their clients hire independent consultants to estimate related fair 
values. I add auditors’ role in SFAS 142 write-off decisions by incorporating two 
variables: (1) ∆ Auditort: An indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm 
experienced auditor change in the year prior to the write-off, 0 otherwise and (2) Big4t: 
An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm employs a Big-4 auditor and zero otherwise. 
The results of multivariate analyses, as reported in table 15, indicate an 
insignificant negative relation between auditor change and the likelihood of SFAS 142 
write-off and an insignificant positive relation between Big4t and the likelihood of SFAS 
142 write-off. 
Across alternative specifications (with and without auditor-related variables) the 
parameters and significance levels on the other variables remain similar to those reported 
earlier. Hence, the results do not appear to be driven by auditors’ role in SFAS 142 
write-off decisions.  
Based on a sample of acquisitions made during the APB Opinion No. 17 era 
(1988-1998), Hayn and Hughes (2006) find that the characteristics of the original 
acquisitions relative to the subsequent financial performance of acquired businesses are 
more powerful predictors of eventual goodwill write-offs. Because overpayments due to 
                                                                                                                                                
Money Options
 t-1, on average, have significantly higher goodwill t-1 balances than firms with below the 
median In the Money Options
 t-1. 
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the driving the price up in the process of bidding or poor negotiation skills may be 
additional factors in recognizing goodwill impairment losses, I control for the 
acquisitions in the year of write-off. I define Acquisitiont which is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the firm has acquisitions during the sample year, and 0 otherwise.  
The results of estimating equation (1) with Acquisitiont, as shown in table 16, 
indicate that firms that acquire other companies during the year are more likely to 
recognize SFAS 142 impairment losses (p value of 0.08). However, Acquisitiont is not 
significantly related to the amount of SFAS 142 write-off. Additionally, inclusion of the 
acquisition control does not alter the main inferences. 
As an additional control variable, I include a continuous measure for the number 
of segments (Segmentst). The number of segments is likely to be negatively associated 
with the likelihood of recognizing SFAS 142 impairment losses if managers use the 
discretion afforded by SFAS 142 to offset the existing impairment losses of various 
reporting units. However, this variable may also capture the complexity of the entity. 
The more complex the entity (greater number of segments), the harder it is to coordinate 
synergies arising from acquisitions, leading to more impairment charges. Therefore, I do 
not predict a sign on Segmentst. 
The results of re-estimating equation (1) and equation (2) after including 
Segmentst are presented in table 17. They show that Segmentst variable is not 
significantly related to the likelihood of SFAS 142 write-offs. However, Segmentst 
variable is positively and significantly related to the amount of SFAS 142 write-offs. 
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This suggests that Segmentst is more likely capturing the underlying economics of the 
firm as opposed to the managerial reporting incentives. 
I control for option holding of directors by including variable Director Optionst-1, 
which is measured as the directors’ stock option holdings in the firm in the year prior to 
the write-off divided by their total compensation from the firm in the year prior to the 
write-off. The option holdings may provide directors with incentives to become more 
effective monitors. On the other hand, option holdings may cause directors’ interests to 
be aligned with managers’ interests to report more favorable results in order to protect 
the value of the options. Consequently, I do not predict a sign on Director Optionst-1. 
The results of the descriptive analyses show that directors of write-off firms have 
significantly less option holdings as a proportion of their compensation than the directors 
of no write-off firms (5% and 11%, respectively). Additionally, as table 18 shows, 
Director Optionst-1 is negatively related to the likelihood of recognizing the existing 
impairment losses. However, there is no significant association between Director 
Optionst-1 and the amount of impairment losses. Thus, there is a weak evidence of the 
notion that option holdings cause directors’ interests to be aligned with managers’ 
interests to report more favorable results. 
6.4. Robustness Tests 
In order to see robustness of the results to the issues arising from multi-period 
nature of write-offs, I examine a sub-sample which excludes 7 firms that accelerated 
SFAS 142 write-offs in the adoption year (along with the matching sample firms).I re-
estimate equation (1) and equation (2) after omitting 7 firms (and their matching pairs) 
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that have accelerated goodwill write-offs in the adoption period. As shown in table 19, I 
find that results are qualitatively similar to those reported earlier.  
47 firms out of 260 firms in my sample have experienced recent CEO changes. 
When firms experience CEO changes, there is usually a change in compensation of their 
CEO, which potentially introduces a measurement error in the compensation data. In 
order to address the concern regarding measurement error in the compensation data for 
those firms with CEO changes, I exclude firms with CEO changes (along with the 
matching sample firms) and re-run the analyses. I re-estimate Equation (1) and Equation 
(2) after omitting 47 firms (and their matching pairs) that have recent CEO changes. As 
shown in table 20, for the logistic analyses, I find that results are essentially similar to 
those reported earlier. However, the coefficients on bonus and in the money options are 
only marginally significant in the tobit specification. 
In summary, the evidence I present in this section provides further support for the 
result that likelihood of recognizing the existing impairment losses is positively related 
to the firms’ strength of governance and negatively related to managers’ holdings of in-
the-money stock options and bonuses.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 This study examines factors that influence managers’ choice to recognize goodwill 
impairment in the years subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 142, which is considered in 
some scholars as a step in the move towards principles-based standards (Schipper, 
2003). The debate surrounding SFAS 142’s effectiveness centered on whether the 
managerial discretion allowed by the standard could lead to biased decisions in 
managers’ determination of goodwill impairment.  
I find that executives’ reporting incentives affect their decision to take SFAS 142 
write-offs, consistent with criticisms of the standard. Specifically, write-offs reported 
under SFAS 142 have strong negative associations with bonus grants and in-the-money 
option holdings of firms’ executives. I also find a strong association between firms’ 
decision to take SFAS 142 write-offs and the strength of their corporate governance, as 
measured by percentage of outside directors, percentage of outside directors’ ownership, 
and separation of CEO and Chair titles. These inferences hold after controlling for firm-
specific variables, industry variables and other determinants of asset write-offs. Overall, 
the results imply that managerial incentives do affect the implementation of principles-
based standards and highlight the importance of corporate boards in the monitoring of 
discretion allowed by such standards. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
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Impairt: A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm recorded an annual (non-
adoption period) goodwill impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t. 
WO %t: The dollar value of annual (non-adoption period) goodwill impairment 
loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t divided by the amount of goodwill at the end of t-1. 
∆ROAt: The percent change in return on assets for firm from period t-1 to t. 
∆Salest: The percent change in sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12) for firm from 
period t-1 to t. 
B/Mt: Book value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) divided by market value 
of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) at the end of t. 
One Segmentt: A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm has one business 
segment at the end of t, and zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT segment file). 
Sizet: Log of market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * 
COMPUSTAT data item 25) at the end of t. 
∆IndROAt: The median change in firm’s industry return on assets from period t-1 
to t, where industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. 
Batht: The proxy for “big bath” reporting, equal to the change in firm’s pre-write-
off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, if value of this 
variable negative, and zero otherwise. 
Smootht: The proxy for “earnings smoothing” reporting, equal to the change in 
firm’s pre-write-off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1, 
if value of this variable positive, and zero otherwise. 
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Debt Ratiot-1: Total liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 181) at the end of t-1 
divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) at the end of t-1. 
CEO Changet: An indicator variable equal to one if firm experiences a change in 
CEO from year t-2 to t, and zero otherwise. 
Bonust-1: Value of bonus compensation for the CEO at the end of t-1 divided by 
CEO’s salary at the end of t-1. 
In-the-Money Optionst-1: Value of in-the-money exercisable options for the CEO at 
the end of t-1 divided by CEO’s salary at the end of t-1. 
Inside Director %t: Percentage of directors who are currently employed or have 
been employed by the firm for the past three years, are related to current management, 
and/or are related to the firm-founder. 
Separate Chairt: An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is not chairman of 
the board, and zero otherwise. 
Directors over 4 Boardst: Sum of all directors with more than 4 corporate 
directorships on a firm’s board of directors. 
Directors Active CEOst: Sum of all directors on a board who are active CEOs of 
public or private companies. 
Outside Director Ownership %t: The common shares held by outside directors 
divided by total common shares outstanding. 
Inside Director Ownership %t: The common shares held by inside directors 
divided by total common shares outstanding.
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Institutional Holdings %t: The common shares held by institutional investors 
divided by total common shares outstanding. 
Transition write-offt-1: An indicator variable 1 if the firm recognized a SFAS 142 
transition period write-off, 0 otherwise. 
Transition write-off %t-1: The amount of SFAS 142 transition period write-off as a 
proportion of beginning of the period goodwill 
Acceleration no write-off: An indicator variable 1 if the firm is of acceleration no 
write-off firm, 0 otherwise. 
Delayed write-off: An indicator variable 1 if the firm is of delayed write-off firm 
and 0 otherwise. 
∆ROA5t: Mean change in firm’s return on assets ratio over firm’s fiscal years t-5 to 
t-1. 
Return5t: Mean of firm’s stock return over firm’s fiscal years from t-5 to t-1. 
∆ Auditort: An indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm experienced 
auditor change in the year prior to the write-off, 0 otherwise. 
Big4t: An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm employs a Big-4 auditor and 
zero otherwise. 
Acquisitiont: An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has acquisitions during the 
sample year, and 0 otherwise.  
Segmentst: Number of segments at the end of t. 
  
63 
Director Optionst-1: Directors’ stock option holdings in the firm in the year prior to 
the write-off divided by their total compensation from the firm in the year prior to the 
write-off. 
∆ Impairt: A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm recorded a goodwill 
impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t and did not record a goodwill 
impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t-1, zero otherwise. 
∆ WO %t: Annual change in the dollar value goodwill impairment loss under 
SFAS 142 at the end of t divided by the amount of goodwill at the end of t-1. 
∆B/Mt: Annual change in book value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) to 
market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) at 
the end of t. 
∆Sizet: Annual change in log of market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 
199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) at the end of t. 
∆Debt Ratiot-1: Annual change in total liabilities (COMPUSTAT data item 181) 
divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) at the end of t-1. 
CEO Changet: An indicator variable equal to one if firm experiences a change in 
CEO from year t-2 to t, and zero otherwise. 
∆Bonust-1: Change in the ratio of CEO’s bonus compensation to CEO’s salary 
from the end of t-2 to the end of t-1. 
∆In-the-Money Optionst-1: Change in the ratio of in-the-money exercisable options 
for the CEO to CEO’s salary from the end of t-2 to the end of t-1. 
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∆Inside Director %t: Annual change in the percentage of directors who are 
currently employed or have been employed by the firm for the past three years, are 
related to current management, and/or are related to the firm-founder. 
∆Separate Chairt: Annual change in the indicator variable Separate Chair which is 
equal to one if the CEO is not chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. 
∆Directors over 4 Boardst: Annual change in sum of all directors with more than 4 
corporate directorships on a firm’s board of directors. 
∆Directors Active CEOst: Annual change in sum of all directors on a board who 
are active CEOs of public or private companies. 
∆Outside Director Ownership%t: Annual change in the ratio of the common shares 
held by outside directors to total common shares outstanding. 
∆Inside Director Ownership%t: Annual change in the ratio of the common shares 
held by inside directors to total common shares outstanding. 
∆Institutional Holdings %t: Annual change in the ratio of the common shares held 
by institutional investors to total common shares outstanding. 
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TABLES 
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TABLE 1 
Sample 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection and Data Sources 
   
  Number 
of 
 Firms 
Initial sample   
Firms on the COMPUSTAT database that have goodwill balances in 
2003 or in 2004 and are relatively more likely to take goodwill write-
offs 
 1,226 
Less:   
ADR’s (CRSP share codes of 30 or 31) 61  
Firms that do not have necessary data available on COMPUSTAT 113  
Domestic firms that have goodwill balances, are relatively more likely 
to take goodwill write-offs, and have available COMPUSTAT data  1,052 
   
Partition   
Firms that are expected to take a SFAS 142 write-off  
and did take a SFAS 142 write-off;  
“initial write-off sample” 
133  
Firms that are expected to take SFAS 142 write-off  
and did not take a SFAS 142 write-off ;  
“all potential no write-off firms” 
919  
  1,052 
Matching Procedure   
Firms that are expected to take a SFAS 142 write-off  
and did take a SFAS 142 write-off; “write-off firms”  130  
Firms that are expected to take SFAS 142 write-off  
and did not take a SFAS 142 write-off; “no write-off firms” 130  
Total number of firms in the study  260 
   
Other Data Sources   
Executive Compensation   
Available from ExecuComp database 129  
Hand collected from proxy statements 131  
Corporate Governance   
Available from the Corporate Library database 111  
Hand collected from proxy statements 149  
Total number of firms in the study  260 
  
67 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Industry and Year Composition 
 
 
SIC Code and Industry Description 
Number 
of 
 Firms 
% of  
Sample 
   
10  Oil and Gas Extraction 6 2.3% 
17  Special trade contractors 6 2.3% 
20  Food and kindred products 2 0.8% 
22  Textile mill products 2 0.8% 
23  Apparel and other textile products 2 0.8% 
27  Printing, publishing and allied industries 2 0.8% 
28  Chemicals and allied products 10 3.8% 
30  Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 2 0.8% 
32  Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 2 0.8% 
33  Primary metal industries 8 3.1% 
34  Fabricated metal products 2 0.8% 
35  Industrial machinery and equipment 14 5.4% 
36  Electrical and electronic equipment; except computer eq. 24 9.2% 
37  Transportation equipment 2 0.8% 
38  Measuring, analyzing, controlling and instruments  6 2.3% 
39  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 4 1.5% 
48  Communications 16 6.2% 
49  Electric, gas, and sanitary services 2 0.8% 
50  Wholesale trade-durable goods 14 5.4% 
51  Wholesale trade-nondurable goods 8 3.1% 
53  General merchandise stores 2 0.8% 
55  Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 4 1.5% 
58  Eating and drinking places 8 3.1% 
59  Miscellaneous retail 6 2.3% 
61  Nondepository credit institutions 2 0.8% 
62  Security, commodity brokers, and services 6 2.3% 
63  Insurance carriers 8 3.1% 
67  Holding and other investment offices 2 0.8% 
72  Personal services 2 0.8% 
73  Business services 52 20.0% 
75  Automotive repair, services, and parking 4 1.5% 
78  Motion pictures 8 3.1% 
79  Amusement and recreational services 4 1.5% 
80  Health, educational, social, and engineering services 6 7.0% 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
25 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75 
Percentile 
 
Max 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
WO%t           
   Write-off firms 0.293 0.248 0.719 0.504 0.242 0.057 0 13.61 14.670 
   No write-off firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.001) (0.001) 
Goodwillt / Assets t          
   Write-off firms 0.234 0.168 0.001 0.102 0.200 0.345 0.745 -0.820 1.074  
   No write-off firms 0.216 0.175 0.001 0.069 0.191 0.311 0.745 (0.415) (0.283) 
Assetst (in millions)          
   Write-off firms 4,750 15,202 10 98 394 2,055 103,878 -0.190 0.214 
   No write-off firms 4,408 13,460 12 99 391 1,802 103,878 (0.848) (0.831) 
∆ ROAt          
   Write-off firms -0.096 0.139 -0.349 -0.202 -0.064 -0.011 0.164 4.430 -6.600 
   No write-off firms -0.004 0.082 -0.350 -0.028 0.001 0.025 0.164 (0.001) (0.001) 
∆ Salest          
   Write-off firms -0.015 0.177 -0.328 -0.136 0.002 0.074 0.366 1.970 -1.807 
   No write-off firms 0.024 0.161 -0.328 -0.068 0.027 0.110 0.366 (0.060) (0.071) 
B/Mt          
   Write-off firms 1.192 1.115 0.168 0.731 0.925 1.250 7.250 -0.920 -0.568 
   No write-off firms 1.091 0.589 0.355 0.790 0.937 1.210 4.834 (0.361) (0.569) 
One Segmentt          
   Write-off firms 0.100 0.301 0 0 0 0 1 0.650 0.652 
   No write-off firms 0.076 0.267 0 0 0 0 1 (0.250) (0.257) 
Change in Industry ROAt          
   Write-off firms 0.005 0.018 -0.014 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.172 -0.370 -0.376 
   No write-off firms 0.004 0.010 -0.015 -0.002 0.002 0.009 0.024 (0.713) (0.707) 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
25 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75 
Percentile 
 
Max 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
Batht          
   Write-off firms -0.046 0.087 -0.597 -0.056 -0.003 0 0 2.480 -2.268 
   No write-off firms -0.024 0.056 -0.406 -0.021 0 0 0 (0.013) (0.016) 
Smootht          
   Write-off firms 0.084 0.237 0 0 0 0.069 1.777 -1.080 -0.378 
   No write-off firms 0.057 0.154 0 0 0.005 0.034 1.359 (0.140) (0.352) 
Debt Ratiot          
   Write-off firms 0.518 0.226 0.056 0.332 0.536 0.681 1.012 -0.330 0.318 
   No write-off firms 0.509 0.215 0.056 0.346 0.519 0.679 1.012 (0.742) (0.751) 
CEO Changet          
   Write-off firms 0.307 0.463 0 0 0 1 1 -5.140 4.905 
   No write-off firms 0.070 0.254 0 0 0 1 1 (0.001) (0.001) 
Bonust-1           
   Write-off firms 0.621 1.138 0 0 0.108 0.663 5.333 2.710 -5.367 
   No write-off firms 1.051 1.405 0 0.251 0.583 1.094 6.450 (0.007) (0.001) 
In the Money Optionst-1           
   Write-off firms 0.716 2.134 0 0 0 0.153 10.342 5.120 -7.789 
   No write-off firms 4.294 10.039 0 0.130 0.809 3.572 60.128 (0.001) (0.001) 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
25 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75 
Percentile 
 
Max 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
Board Sizet          
   Write-off firms 7.985 2.196 4 6 8 9 15 -0.060 -0.126 
   No write-off firms 7.969 1.917 5 7 8 9 15 (0.951) (0.900) 
Inside Director %t          
   Write-off firms 0.224 0.127 0 0.142 0.222 0.333 0.600 5.810 -5.359 
   No write-off firms 0.314 0.132 0.100 0.167 0.233 0.340 0.667 (0.001) (0.001) 
Separate Chairt          
   Write-off firms 0.561 0.498 0 0 0 1 1 -3.560 3.480 
   No write-off firms 0.346 0.478 0 0 0 1 1 (0.001) (0.001) 
Directors Over 4 Boardst          
   Write-off firms 0.662 1.016 0 0 0 1 5 3.890 -4.138 
   No write-off firms 0.961 1.164 0 0 1 1 5 (0.001) (0.001) 
Directors Active CEOst          
   Write-off firms 1.430 1.452 0 0 1 2 6 -0.230 -0.513 
   No write-off firms 1.392 1.185 0 1 1 2 6 (0.815) (0.304) 
Outside Director Ownership %t          
   Write-off firms 0.067 0.121 0 0.001 0.015 0.076 0.589 -2.450 3.683 
   No write-off firms 0.035 0.090 0 0 0.003 0.020 0.589 (0.015) (0.001) 
Inside Director Ownership %t          
   Write-off firms 0.074 0.115 0 0.001 0.031 0.087 0.588 3.020 -3.751 
   No write-off firms 0.122 0.139 0 0.021 0.057 0.193 0.588 (0.003) (0.001) 
Institutional Holdings %t          
   Write-off firms 0.358 0.341 0 0 0.282 0.691 0.970 0.580 -0.769 
   No write-off firms 0.382 0.334 0 0 0.332 0.679 0.970 (0.564) (0.442) 
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TABLE 3  
Correlation Analysis 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Impairt 
1       
              
0.65 2 WO %t 
(0.01) 1     
              
-0.15 -0.23 3 Batht 
(0.01) (0.01) 1   
              
0.07 0.04 0.17 4 Smootht 
(0.28) (0.52) (0.01) 1 
              
-0.17 -0.17 0.16 -0.01 5 Bonust-1  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.97) 
1             
-0.21 -0.16 0.1 -0.01 0.14 6 Optionst-1  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.98) -0.02 
1           
-0.34 -0.26 0.17 -0.06 0.12 0.13 7 Inside Director %t 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.36) (0.06) (0.04) 
1         
0.22 0.14 -0.04 0.05 -0.20 -0.09 -0.03 8 Separate Chairt 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.50) (0.42) (0.01) (0.14) (0.66) 
1       
-0.24 -0.19 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.13 9 Directors Over 4  
Boardst (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.87) (0.24) (0.63) (0.52) (0.03) 
1     
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.38 10 Directors 
Active CEOst (0.82) (0.97) (0.79) (0.89) (0.01) (0.70) (0.13) (0.88) (0.01) 
1   
11 Outside 0.15 0.07 -0.12 -0.06 -0.1 -0.08 -0.12 0.05 0.12 -0.1 
Director Ownership %t (0.02) (0.28) (0.06) (0.33) (0.1) (0.21) (0.05) (0.45) (0.05) (0.12) 
1 
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TABLE 4 
Factors Influencing the Likelihood of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairment Recognition 
(Dichotomous Logistic Regression Model) 
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision 
(logistic) for a matched sample of 260 firms, which were all expected to take a write-off. 
The dependent variable, impairt, is write-off firm (1) versus matched no write-off firm (0). Other variables are defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for 
directional hypotheses. Coefficient estimates are standardized on the respective 
independent variables. Percent change is the change in odds and equal to (odds ratio – 
1)*100. 
 
 
Variable  
 
Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate 
Percent  
Change 
Chi-sqr. 
Value 
 
p-value 
Intercept ?   4.436 0.035 
      
Economic Factors      
   ∆ ROAt - -0.808 -55.4% 18.175 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - -0.143 -13.3% 1.828 0.088 
   B/Mt +  0.205 22.7% 2.710 0.050 
   One Segmentt ? 0.110 11.6% 1.201 0.137 
   Sizet ? 0.528 69.6% 10.588 0.001 
      
Reporting Incentives      
   Batht - -0.078 -7.5% 0.303 0.291 
   Smootht + 0.452 57.2% 9.710 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? -0.132 -12.3% 1.679 0.195 
   CEO Changet + 0.317 37.3% 7.477 0.003 
   Bonust-1  - -0.156 -14.4% 1.782 0.090 
In the Money Optionst-1  - -0.395 -32.6% 4.914 0.013 
         
Corporate Governance      
   Inside Director %t - -0.292 -25.3% 7.233 0.004 
   Separate Chairt + 0.185 20.3% 3.405 0.033 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - -0.515 -40.2% 18.838 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.049 5.1% 0.179 0.336 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.306 35.8% 7.021 0.004 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? -0.168 -15.4% 2.096 0.148 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? -0.152 -14.1% 1.501 0.220 
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TABLE 5 
Factors Influencing the Percentage of Goodwill Written off 
(Tobit Model) 
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the percentage of goodwill written 
off (tobit regression) for a matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent variable, WO%t, 
is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off divided 
by the amount of goodwill at the beginning of the year. Other variables are defined in the 
appendix. One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
 
Variable  
 
Pred. 
Coef. 
Estimate 
 
t value 
 
p-value 
Intercept ? 0.124 1.14 0.256 
     
Economic Factors     
   ∆ ROAt - -1.378 -8.790 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - -0.062 -0.510 0.305 
   B/Mt + 0.038 1.630 0.052 
   One Segmentt ?  0.014 0.200 0.840 
   Sizet ?  0.039 2.740 0.006 
     
Reporting Incentives     
   Batht - -0.663 -2.110 0.017 
   Smootht + 0.733 6.020 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? -0.023 -0.240 0.810 
   CEO Changet + 0.082 1.610 0.053 
   Bonust-1 - -0.026 -1.340 0.091 
   In the Money Optionst-1  - -0.013 -2.530 0.006 
        
Corporate Governance     
   Inside Director %t - -0.510 -2.990 0.002 
   Separate Chairt +  0.032  0.760 0.183 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - -0.079 -3.900 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst -  0.017 0.990 0.160 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.421 2.300 0.011 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? -0.113 -0.600 0.549 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? -0.029 -0.400 0.690 
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TABLE 6 
Multi-Period Analyses 
 
Panel A: Flow Chart of SFAS 142 Transition and Subsequent Period Choices 
 
Transition  Period   Subsequent Period  Label # Obs. 
     
 
 write-off  "timely write-off" 43 
 
 
 
 expected  
 
  
 
 no write-off  "postponing firms" 11 
 
 write-off 
 
  
 
 not expected   
expected     
  write-off  "delayed write-off" 55 
 
 
 expected  
 
  
  
 no write-off  "postponing firms" 103 
  no write-off 
 
 
  
 
  not expected    
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Flow Chart of SFAS 142 Transition and Subsequent Period Choices 
 
Transition Period   Subsequent Period  Label # Obs. 
 
  write-off  "acceleration" 0 
  
 
 expected  
  
  
  
 no write-off  "acceleration" 7 
  write-off 
 
 
 
  
 
 not expected   
not expected     
 
 write-off  "timely write-off" 32 
 
 
 expected  
  
  
 
 
 no write-off  "postponing firms" 9 
  no write-off 
 
 
   
 
  not expected    total 260 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Frequency analysis  
 
 Number of firms Number of firms 
"Timely write-off" 75  
"Delayed write-off" 55  
Total write-off firms  130 
   
"Postponing (no write-off)" 123  
"Acceleration (no write-off)" 7  
Total no write-off firms  130 
   
Total firms  260 
 
 
 
(1) Timely write-off firms are the firms that (a) were expected18 to take a write-off 
both in the transition and the subsequent period and did take write-offs both in the 
transition and subsequent periods, and (b) were not expected to take a write-off in the 
transition period and did not take a write-off in the transition period; and were expected 
to take a write-off in the subsequent period and did take a write-off in the subsequent 
period (categories a and b represent 75 out of 130 write-off firms). 
(2) Delayed write-off firms are the firms that were expected to take a write-off in 
the transition period; did not take a write-off in the transition period but took a write-off 
in the subsequent period (55 out of 130 write-off firms). 
(3) Postponing (no write-off) firms are the firms that (a) were expected to take a 
write-off in the transition period, and did not take a write-off in the transition and 
subsequent periods; (b) were expected to take a write-off in the subsequent period, and 
did not take a write-off in the subsequent periods (categories a and b represent 123 out of 
130 no write-off firms).  
(4) Acceleration (no write-off) firms are firms that were not expected to take a 
write-off in the transition period; did take a substantial write-off in the transition period; 
and did not take a write-off in the subsequent period (7 out of 130 no write-off firms). 
                                                 
18
 A firm is expected to take a write-off, if the difference between its market value and book value is less 
than its recorded goodwill.  
  77
 
TABLE 7  
Descriptive Statistics of Change Variables 
 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
25 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75 
Percentile 
 
Max 
t-test* 
(p-value) 
Batht         
   Timely write-off firms -0.036 0.069 -0.345 -0.050 0 0 0 2.480 
   Delayed write-off firms -0.044 0.070 -0.305 -0.067 -0.010 0 0 (0.013) 
   Postponing firms -0.026 0.057 -0.406 -0.027 0 0 0  
   Acceleration  firms -0.115 0.226 -0.590 -0.213 0 0 0  
Smootht         
   Timely write-off firms 0.119 0.288 0 0 0.012 0.094 1.777 -1.080 
   Delayed write-off firms 0.050 0.143 0 0 0.005 0.049 0.993 (0.140) 
   Postponing firms 0.045 0.147 0 0 0 0.026 1.359  
   Acceleration firms 0.153 0.181 0 0 0.082 0.199 0.521  
∆Bonust-1         
   Timely write-off firms 0.061 0.527 -0.870 -0.063 0 0.216 0.980 2.370 
   Delayed write-off firms -0.125 0.564 -0.870 -0.718 -0.037 0.055 0.980 (0.005) 
   Postponing firms 0.119 0.460 -0.870 -0.047 0.007 0.411 0.980  
   Acceleration firms 0.170 0.830 -0.870 -0.850 0 0.960 0.980  
∆In the Money Optionst-1         
   Timely write-off firms -0.090 0.212 -1.000 -0.900 -0.119 0 1.060 5.020 
   Delayed write-off firms -0.282 0.337 -1.000 -0.890 -0.347 0 1.060 (0.001) 
   Postponing firms 0.150 0.171 -1.000 0 0.120 0.654 1.060  
   Acceleration firms 0.230 0.560 -1.000 -0.900 0.548 1.020 1.060  
* Tests for differences in means of write-off (timely and delayed) and no write-off (postponing and acceleration) firms. 
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
  
Mean 
Std.  
Dev. 
 
Min 
25 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75 
Percentile 
 
Max 
t-test 
(p-value) 
∆Inside Director %t         
   Timely write-off firms -0.083 0.154 -0.633 -0.125 -0.056 0 0.500 5.900 
   Delayed write-off firms -0.110 0.131 -0.527 -0.154 -0.092 0 0.260 (0.001) 
   Postponing firms -0.018 0.065 -0.303 0 0 0 0.223  
   Acceleration firms 0.033 0.076 -0.047 0 0 0.130 0.151  
∆Separate Chairt         
   Timely write-off firms 0.081 0.567 -1 0 0 0 1 -4.610 
   Delayed write-off firms 0.210 0.562 -1 0 0 1 1 (0.001) 
   Postponing firms -0.097 0.392 -1 0 0 0 1  
   Acceleration firms 0 0.577 -1 0 0 0 1  
∆Directors Over 4 Boardst         
   Timely write-off firms 0.081 0.975 -2 0 0 0 5 2.850 
   Delayed write-off firms -0.232 1.008 -3 -1 0 0 3 (0.003) 
   Postponing firms 0.203 0.799 -2 0 0 0 4  
   Acceleration firms 0.428 0.786 0 0 0 1 2  
∆Directors Active CEOst         
   Timely write-off firms -0.189 0.805 -3 0 0 0 3 1.400 
   Delayed write-off firms -0.161 0.803 -3 0 0 0 2 (0.080) 
   Postponing firms -0.089 0.652 -3 0 0 0 4  
   Acceleration firms 0.428 0.534 0 0 0 1 1  
∆Outside Director Ownership%t         
   Timely write-off firms 0.014 0.067 -0.160 0 0 0.012 0.303 -4.450 
   Delayed write-off firms 0.024 0.065 -0.090 0 0 0.025 0.391 (0.001) 
   Postponing firms -0.005 0.026 -0.241 0 0 0 0.020  
   Acceleration firms 0.009 0.088 -0.097 -0.057 0 0.050 0.180  
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TABLE 8 
Changes Analyses to Examine the Factors Influencing the Likelihood of  
SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairment Recognition 
 
Coefficient estimates and test statistics from the estimation of the change in SFAS 142 
write-off decision (logistic) for a sample of 260 firms, which were all expected to take a 
write-off. The dependent variable, ∆ impairt, is a dichotomous variable equal to one if 
the firm recorded a goodwill impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t and did not 
record a goodwill impairment loss under SFAS 142 at the end of t-1, zero otherwise. 
Other variables are defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for directional 
hypotheses. Coefficient estimates are standardized on the respective independent 
variables. Percent change is the change in odds and equal to (odds ratio – 1)*100. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
 
Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate 
Percent  
Change 
Chi-sqr. 
Value 
 
p-value 
Intercept ?   38.746 0.001 
      
Economic Factors      
  ∆ ROAt - -0.306 -26.4% 5.634 0.009 
  ∆ Salest - -0.106 -10.0% 1.794 0.090 
  ∆ B/Mt +  0.059 6.1% 0.345 0.278 
  ∆ Sizet ? 0.029 3.0% 0.073 0.787 
Reporting Incentives      
   Batht - -0.027 -2.6% 0.068 0.397 
   Smootht + 0.127 11.9% 1.373 0.121 
   ∆ Debt Ratiot-1 ? -0.173 -15.9% 3.630 0.057 
   CEO Changet + 0.214 23.9% 5.282 0.010 
   ∆ Bonust-1  - -0.121 -11.4% 1.774 0.091 
∆ In the Money Optionst-1  - -0.172 -15.8% 3.745 0.027 
Corporate Governance      
   ∆ Inside Director %t - -0.493 -38.9% 19.931 0.001 
   ∆ Separate Chairt + 0.220 24.6% 5.411 0.010 
   ∆ Directors Over 4 Boardst - -0.342 -29.0% 13.074 0.001 
   ∆ Directors Active CEOst - -0.095 -9.1% 1.085 0.149 
   ∆ Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.315 37.1% 7.011 0.004 
   ∆ Inside Director Ownership %t ? -0.172 -15.8% 2.516 0.113 
  ∆ Institutional Holdings %t ? -0.071 -6.8% 0.684 0.408 
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TABLE 9 
Changes Analyses to Examine the Factors Influencing 
 the Percentage of Goodwill Written off 
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the change in percentage of 
goodwill written off (OLS regression) for a matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent 
variable, ∆ WO%t, is the annual change in dollar value of SFAS 142 goodwill write-off 
divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning of the year. Other variables are 
defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
 
Variable  
 
Pred. 
Coef. 
Estimate 
 
t value 
 
p-value 
Intercept ? 0.033 1.970 0.050 
     
Economic Factors     
   ∆ ROAt - -0.921 -8.520 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - -0.013 -1.090 0.137 
   ∆ B/Mt + 0.145 1.810 0.036 
   ∆ Sizet ? -0.047 -1.840 0.067 
     
Reporting Incentives     
   Batht - -0.578 -2.890 0.002 
   Smootht + 0.156 1.860 0.032 
  ∆ Debt Ratiot-1 ? 0.002 0.300 0.766 
   CEO Changet + 0.011 0.330 0.370 
  ∆ Bonust-1  - -0.014 -1.320 0.094 
  ∆ In the Money Optionst-1  - -0.004 -2.510 0.006 
        
Corporate Governance     
   ∆ Inside Director %t - -0.255 -2.230 0.013 
   ∆ Separate Chairt + 0.035 1.270 0.100 
   ∆ Directors Over 4 Boardst - -0.036 -2.430 0.008 
   ∆ Directors Active CEOst - -0.004 -0.210 0.420 
   ∆ Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.050 0.210 0.417 
   ∆ Inside Director Ownership %t ? 0.045 0.240 0.406 
   ∆ Institutional Holdings %t ? -0.050 -0.670 0.251 
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TABLE 10  
Descriptive Statistics of Additional Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean 
Std 
Dev Min 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
Percentile Max 
t-test  
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
Transition write-offt-1          
   Write-off firms 0.252 0.436 0 0 0 1 1 -1.700 -1.690 
   No write-off firms 0.164 0.372 0 0 0 0 1 (0.100) (0.110) 
Transition write-off %t-1          
   Write-off firms 0.153 0.514 0 0 0 0.002 3.680 -1.700 -1.701 
   No write-off firms 0.127 0.527 0 0 0 0 3.957 (0.100) (0.100) 
∆ ROA5t          
   Write-off firms -0.015 0.213 -0.360 -0.026 -0.009 0.003 2.236 1.020 0.283 
   No write-off firms -0.025 0.055 -0.360 -0.026 -0.008 0.004 0.274 (0.309) (0.389) 
Return5t          
   Write-off firms -0.017 0.404 -0.820 -0.197 -0.010 0.153 0.990 -0.460 -0.434 
   No write-off firms -0.006 0.422 -0.820 -0.195 -0.044 0.169 0.990 (0.322) (0.332) 
* Tests for differences in means of write-off and no write-off firms. 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Mean 
Std 
Dev Min 
25 
Percentile Median 
75 
Percentile Max 
t-test  
(p-value) 
Wilcoxon 
(p-value) 
∆ Auditort          
   Write-off firms 0.083 0.225 0 0 0 0 1 -0.23 -0.225 
   No write-off firms 0.077 0.212 0 0 0 0 1 (0.821) (0.822) 
Big4t          
   Write-off firms 0.711 0.393 0 0 1 1 1 -0.12 -0.119 
   No write-off firms 0.704 0.398 0 0 1 1 1 (0.454) (0.452) 
Acquisitiont          
   Write-off firms 0.265 0.443 0 0 0 1 1 -0.57 -0.571 
   No write-off firms 0.234 0.425 0 0 0 0 1 (0.562) (0.568) 
Segmentst          
   Write-off firms 7.177 3.997 1 4 6 10 20 -0.49 -0.575 
   No write-off firms 6.926 4.170 1 4 6 8 22 (0.626) (0.566) 
Director Optionst          
   Write-off firms 0.058 0.140 0 0 0.011 0.042 1 2.87 5.983 
   No write-off firms 0.116 0.181 0 0.001 0.053 0.136 1 (0.004) (0.001) 
* Tests for differences in means of write-off and no write-off firms. 
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TABLE 11  
Transition Period Variables 
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision 
(logistic) for a matched sample of 260 firms, which were all expected to take a write-off. 
The dependent variable, impairt, is write-off firm (1) versus matched no write-off firm 
(0). Other variables are defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for 
directional hypotheses. Coefficient estimates are standardized on the respective 
independent variables. 
 Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Economic Factors  
    
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.635 0.001 -0.626 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.204 0.026 -0.265 0.025 
   One Segmentt ? 0.059 0.540 0.056 0.617 
   B/Mt + 0.187 0.079 0.242 0.030 
   Sizet ? 0.474 0.003 0.609 0.002 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.122 0.178 -0.159 0.129 
   Smootht + 0.395 0.003 0.467 0.002 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.131 0.199 -0.124 0.295 
   CEO Changet + 0.297 0.005 0.310 0.007 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.137 0.107 -0.046 0.114 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.358 0.017 -0.247 0.088 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.362 0.001 -0.426 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.187 0.032 0.220 0.032 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.488 0.001 -0.433 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.085 0.233 -0.012 0.466 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.264 0.010 0.263 0.033 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.154 0.173 -0.100 0.439 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.176 0.155 -0.213 0.179 
Transition period variables  
    
   Transition write-offt-1 ? 0.155 0.129 - - 
   Delayed write-offt-1 ? - - 1.006 0.001 
   Acceleration no write-offt-1 - - - -0.371 0.063 
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TABLE 12  
Transition Period Variables  
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the percentage of goodwill written 
off (tobit regression) for a matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent variable, 
WO%t, is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off 
divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning of the year. Other variables are 
defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
 Pred. 
Coef. 
estimate p-value 
Coef. 
estimate p-value 
Economic Factors  
    
   ∆ ROAt - 
-1.289 0.001 -1.217 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.090 0.223 -0.107 0.178 
   One Segmentt ? 0.002 0.975 -0.010 0.885 
   B/Mt + 0.035 0.061 0.040 0.033 
   Sizet ? 0.031 0.027 0.035 0.011 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.437 0.120 -0.312 0.269 
   Smootht + 0.648 0.001 0.655 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 0.004 0.551 0.007 0.276 
   CEO Changet + 0.051 0.153 0.061 0.104 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.019 0.109 -0.008 0.155 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.011 0.011 -0.010 0.017 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.567 0.001 -0.534 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.085 0.020 0.067 0.052 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.066 0.001 -0.052 0.007 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.017 0.148 0.005 0.385 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.356 0.021 0.217 0.107 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.096 0.599 -0.028 0.876 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.023 0.746 -0.024 0.728 
Transition Period Variables  
    
   Transition write-off %t-1 ? 0.060 0.084   
   Delayed write-offt-1 ? 
  0.196 0.001 
   Acceleration no write-offt-1 - 
  -0.081 0.240 
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TABLE 13  
Past Performance Variables (Logistic Regression) 
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision 
(logistic) for a matched sample of 260 firms, which were all expected to take a write-off. 
The dependent variable, impairt, is write-off firm (1) versus matched no write-off firm 
(0). Other variables are defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for 
directional hypotheses. Coefficient estimates are standardized on the respective 
independent variables. 
 
 Pred. 
Std. 
Coef. 
Estimate 
p-
value 
Std. 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Economic Factors 
     
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.662 0.001 -0.621 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.169 0.059 -0.205 0.026 
   One Segmentt ? 0.063 0.537 0.083 0.406 
   B/Mt + 0.214 0.047 0.193 0.065 
   Sizet ? 0.481 0.003 0.524 0.001 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.081 0.273 -0.109 0.207 
   Smootht + 0.424 0.002 0.436 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.077 0.455 -0.145 0.159 
   CEO Changet + 0.258 0.014 0.300 0.005 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.085 0.101 -0.104 0.176 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.369 0.024 -0.394 0.015 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.358 0.001 -0.381 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.246 0.017 0.238 0.019 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.471 0.001 -0.443 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.077 0.257 0.064 0.289 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.272 0.024 0.278 0.019 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.148 0.193 -0.168 0.140 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.144 0.257 -0.216 0.092 
Past Performance Variables  
    
   ∆ ROA5t - 
-0.355 0.120   
  Return5t - 
  -0.170 0.046 
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TABLE 14 
Past Performance Variables (Tobit Regression) 
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the percentage of goodwill written 
off (tobit regression) for a matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent variable, 
WO%t, is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off 
divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning of the year. Other variables are 
defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for directional hypotheses. 
 
 Pred. 
Coef. 
estimate p-value 
Coef. 
estimate p-value 
Economic Factors  
    
   ∆ ROAt - 
-1.254 0.001 -1.261 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.075 0.272 -0.113 0.169 
   One Segmentt ? 0.009 0.896 0.006 0.927 
   B/Mt + 0.034 0.072 0.035 0.059 
   Sizet ? 0.035 0.014 0.037 0.009 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.386 0.178 -0.395 0.162 
   Smootht + 0.678 0.001 0.679 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 0.003 0.650 0.003 0.675 
   CEO Changet + 0.048 0.173 0.059 0.118 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.013 0.113 -0.014 0.171 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.012 0.014 -0.012 0.017 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.576 0.001 -0.616 0.000 
   Separate Chairt + 0.096 0.025 0.101 0.016 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.067 0.001 -0.062 0.002 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.014 0.404 0.014 0.390 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.363 0.043 0.338 0.056 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.112 0.549 -0.081 0.655 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.038 0.594 -0.056 0.438 
Past Performance Variables  
    
   ∆ ROA5t 
 -0.029 0.398   
  Return5t 
   -0.081 0.047 
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TABLE 15  
Audit-Related Variables  
 
Coefficients and test statistics from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision 
(logistic) for a matched sample of 260 firms, which were all expected to take a write-off. 
The dependent variable, impairt, is write-off firm (1) versus matched no write-off firm 
(0). Other variables are defined in the appendix. One-tailed test is employed for 
directional hypotheses. Coefficient estimates are standardized on the respective 
independent variables. 
 
 Pred. 
Std. 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Std. 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Economic Factors 
     
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.640 0.001 -0.652 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.206 0.054 -0.211 0.047 
   One Segmentt ? 0.073 0.459 0.074 0.453 
   B/Mt + 0.207 0.098 0.204 0.104 
   Sizet ? 0.507 0.001 0.577 0.001 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.109 0.408 -0.120 0.370 
   Smootht + 0.418 0.003 0.433 0.002 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.117 0.244 -0.118 0.248 
   CEO Changet + 0.300 0.010 0.303 0.009 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.126 0.134 -0.145 0.101 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.381 0.012 -0.369 0.016 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.361 0.001 -0.398 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.208 0.036 0.207 0.038 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.455 0.001 -0.470 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.063 0.294 0.072 0.268 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.266 0.020 0.283 0.015 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.149 0.184 -0.156 0.166 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.176 0.158 -0.161 0.195 
Audit-Related Variables  
    
   ∆ Auditort ? -0.036 0.711 - - 
  Big4t ? - - 0.172 0.229 
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TABLE 16  
Control for Acquisitions  
 
Coefficients and p-values from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision for a 
matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent variable for logistic regression is impairt, 
coded 1 if write-off firm and coded 0 if matched no write-off firm. The dependent 
variable for tobit regression is WO%t, which is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption 
period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning 
of the year.  
 
  Logistic Regression 
Tobit 
 Regression 
 Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Economic Factors 
     
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.647 0.001 1.274 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.237 0.029 0.138 0.252 
   One Segmentt ? 0.089 0.366 0.009 0.893 
   B/Mt + 0.235 0.067 0.037 0.095 
   Sizet ? 0.509 0.001 0.033 0.017 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.097 0.228 -0.415 0.142 
   Smootht + 0.419 0.003 0.666 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.150 0.150 0.002 0.724 
   CEO Changet + 0.296 0.010 0.059 0.119 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.126 0.104 0.017 0.121 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.395 0.028 0.011 0.018 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.371 0.001 0.584 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.211 0.034 0.093 0.025 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.458 0.001 0.065 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.056 0.317 0.014 0.198 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.268 0.020 0.348 0.049 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.158 0.161 0.082 0.651 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.182 0.149 0.033 0.637 
Additional Control Variable  
    
   Acquisitiont ? 0.168 0.078 0.066 0.138 
89 
 
TABLE 17 
Control for Number of Segments  
 
Coefficients and p-values from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision for a 
matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent variable for logistic regression is impairt, 
coded 1 if write-off firm and coded 0 if matched no write-off firm. The dependent 
variable for tobit regression is WO%t, which is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption 
period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning 
of the year. 
 
  
Logistic  
Regression 
Tobit         
Regression 
 Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Economic Factors 
     
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.636 0.000 1.228 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.194 0.076 0.118 0.324 
   One Segmentt ? 0.069 0.512 0.039 0.594 
   B/Mt + 0.179 0.160 0.031 0.165 
   Sizet ? 0.448 0.006 0.027 0.062 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.167 0.240 0.367 0.199 
   Smootht + 0.436 0.003 0.657 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.110 0.283 0.006 0.409 
   CEO Changet + 0.294 0.012 0.054 0.138 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.115 0.148 0.020 0.147 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.291 0.049 0.010 0.022 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.359 0.001 0.579 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.224 0.029 0.094 0.026 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.399 0.001 0.057 0.004 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.061 0.304 0.019 0.102 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.282 0.015 0.354 0.044 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.123 0.286 0.089 0.637 
   Institutional Holdings  %t ? 
-0.188 0.126 0.039 0.582 
Additional Control Variable  
    
   Segmentst ? 0.102 0.340 0.011 0.045 
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TABLE 18  
Control for Option Holdings of Directors  
 
Coefficients and p-values from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision for a 
matched sample of 260 firms. The dependent variable for logistic regression is impairt, 
coded 1 if write-off firm and coded 0 if matched no write-off firm. The dependent 
variable for tobit regression is WO%t, which is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption 
period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning 
of the year. 
 
  Logistic Regression Tobit Regression 
 Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Economic Factors      
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.664 0.001 -1.275 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.209 0.025 -0.095 0.212 
   One Segmentt ? 0.068 0.244 0.005 0.473 
   B/Mt + 0.215 0.046 0.035 0.059 
   Sizet ? 0.498 0.002 0.033 0.018 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.117 0.374 -0.424 0.135 
   Smootht + 0.436 0.002 0.672 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.080 0.432 0.005 0.455 
   CEO Changet + 0.317 0.008 0.056 0.256 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.088 0.103 -0.015 0.219 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.369 0.026 -0.011 0.019 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.380 0.001 -0.585 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.185 0.066 0.083 0.047 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.453 0.001 -0.065 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.036 0.757 0.015 0.358 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.252 0.027 0.326 0.065 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.163 0.149 0.080 0.662 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.150 0.237 0.020 0.777 
Additional Control Variable  
    
   Director Optionst ? 
-0.197 0.080 0.128 0.355 
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TABLE 19 
Sub-sample Excluding Acceleration Firms  
 
Coefficients and p-values from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision for a 
matched sample of 246 firms. The dependent variable for logistic regression is impairt, 
coded 1 if write-off firm and coded 0 if matched no write-off firm. The dependent 
variable for tobit regression is WO%t, which is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption 
period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning 
of the year.  
 
  Logistic Regression Tobit Regression 
 Pred. 
Std. 
Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Coef. 
estimate p-value 
Economic Factors      
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.681 0.001 -1.362 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.205 0.030 -0.075 0.264 
   One Segmentt ? 0.064 0.522 0.005 0.942 
   B/Mt + 0.214 0.037 0.053 0.019 
   Sizet ? 0.495 0.003 0.033 0.025 
Reporting Incentives  
    
   Batht - 
-0.049 0.347 -0.540 0.094 
   Smootht + 0.416 0.004 0.648 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.101 0.316 0.006 0.410 
   CEO Changet + 0.270 0.020 0.031 0.270 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.161 0.087 -0.024 0.105 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.303 0.043 -0.010 0.024 
Corporate Governance  
    
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.368 0.002 -0.587 0.001 
   Separate Chairt + 0.191 0.063 0.090 0.033 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.482 0.001 -0.066 0.001 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.049 0.678 0.016 0.339 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.282 0.016 0.354 0.045 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.170 0.142 -0.074 0.691 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.173 0.178 -0.008 0.907 
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TABLE 20 
Sub-sample Excluding Firms that Have CEO Changes 
 
Coefficients and p-values from the estimation of the SFAS 142 write-off decision for a 
matched sample of 166 firms. The dependent variable for logistic regression is impairt, 
coded 1 if write-off firm and coded 0 if matched no write-off firm. The dependent 
variable for tobit regression is WO%t, which is the dollar value of annual (non-adoption 
period) SFAS 142 goodwill write-off divided by the amount of goodwill at the beginning 
of the year. 
  
  Logistic Regression Tobit Regression 
 Pred. 
Std. Coef. 
Estimate p-value 
Coef. 
estimate p-value 
Economic Factors      
   ∆ ROAt - 
-0.746 0.001 -1.476 0.001 
   ∆ Salest - 
-0.234 0.037 -0.164 0.247 
   One Segmentt ? 0.041 0.729 0.024 0.751 
   B/Mt + 0.250 0.136 0.016 0.541 
   Sizet ? 0.465 0.018 0.016 0.348 
Reporting Incentives 
     
   Batht - 
-0.091 0.514 -0.545 0.148 
   Smootht + 0.473 0.006 0.804 0.001 
   Debt Ratiot-1 ? 
-0.212 0.116 -0.002 0.853 
   Bonust-1  - 
-0.250 0.050 -0.029 0.118 
In the Money Optionst-1  - 
-0.207 0.089 -0.006 0.104 
Corporate Governance 
     
   Inside Director %t - 
-0.201 0.060 0.467 0.022 
   Separate Chairt + 0.173 0.072 0.088 0.064 
   Directors Over 4 Boardst - 
-0.505 0.001 0.065 0.006 
   Directors Active CEOst - 0.103 0.240 0.024 0.234 
   Outside Director Ownership %t + 0.301 0.029 0.368 0.041 
   Inside Director Ownership %t ? 
-0.250 0.069 0.103 0.600 
   Institutional Holdings %t ? 
-0.179 0.225 0.046 0.577 
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